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RECONCILING CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE AND A
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A "MEANINGFUL
REVIEW" AT GUANTANAMO BAY:
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Sarah Lorr*
In Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the
detainees held at Guant4namo Bay have a constitutionalright to a writ of
habeas corpus and are entitled to a "meaningful review" of their habeas
petitions. This Note attempts to reconcile the need for a "meaningful
review" with the government's reliance on classified evidence that is
completely inaccessible to the detainee-petitioners. After examining three
other contexts in which the reliance on classified evidence has been
sanctioned-federal criminal courts, immigration cases, and the ongoing
military commissions at Guantnamo-this Note concludes that a
"meaningful review" of the Guantcinamo habeaspetitions requires that the
detainees be provided with regulated access to the evidence against them.
Specifically, this Note recommends that the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA) or a CIPA-like statute be adapted to the habeas
context so that detainees have, at a minimum, summaries of the key
evidence againstthem.
INTRODUCTION

On January 22, 2009, in a dramatic break with the policies of former
President George W. Bush, 1 President Barack Hussein Obama ordered the
closure of the detention facilities at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. 2 The
executive order pledges complete closure within one year 3 and creates an

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Haverford College.
Thank you to Professors Martha Rayner and Deborah Denno for their invaluable knowledge,
energy, and guidance and to my family for being so tremendously supportive.
1. See Jess Bravin & Laura Meckler, Obama Set to Undo Bush's Gitmo Policies, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 22, 2009, at A3; Scott Shane et al., Obama Reverses Key Bush Policy, but
Questions on DetaineesRemain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A16 (describing the executive

orders as "revers[ing] the most disputed counterterrorism policies of the Bush
administration").
2. Exec. Order No. 13,492, § 3, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 27, 2009) ("The
detention facilities at Guantdnamo for individuals covered by this order shall be closed as
soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order.").
3. Id.
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interagency panel to review the "status" of detainees currently held.4 More
generally, the order requires that "the prompt and appropriate disposition of
the individuals detained at Guantdnamo should precede the closure of the
detention facilities at Guantdnamo. ' '5 Although the speed with which the
order was issued and its tone show that closing Guantdnamo is a top priority
for the new administration, the futures of the individual men who remain
detained are far from clear. 6 The ongoing habeas cases remain the principle
method for those currently detained to challenge the legality of their
7
detention.
The first of the Guantdnamo habeas cases concluded on November 20,
2008, when Judge Richard J. Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District8
of Columbia ordered the release of five detainees held at Guantdnamo.
One of those ordered released was Lakhdar Boumediene, the lead petitioner
in the U.S. Supreme Court's July 2008 decision, Boumediene v. Bush.9 In
Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that prisoners in military detention
have the right to "invoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas0
corpus" and that their petitions must be given a "meaningful review."
4. Id. § 4(a). The Attorney General will lead the review while the Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of National Intelligence, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and "other officers or ... employees" of the United States will
participate in the review as necessary. Id. § 4(b)(1)-(7). Additionally, the order pledges
renewed diplomatic efforts aimed at securing the repatriation of those still held at
Guantinamo. Id. § 2(d).
5. Id. § 2(b), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4897. The order articulated that it is "in the interests of
the United States" for the Executive to begin a "prompt and thorough review" of the
justification for continued detention of remaining detainees. Id. § 2(d), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898.
6. The executive order contemplates that the review, following the collection and
review of information about each detainee, will determine whether detainees can be
transferred or prosecuted or a rolling basis. Id. § 4(c)(l)-(2), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99.
Additionally, the order leaves open the possibility that some men will neither be prosecuted
or transferred. Id. § 4(c)(3), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4899. With respect to these men, the order
directs only that "the Review shall select lawful means, consistent with the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice, for the
disposition of such individuals." Id. § 4(c)(4). The debate over this issue focuses both on the
current detainees and the issue of detention of terrorists in general. See, e.g., William
Glaberson, Post-Guantnamo: A New Detention Law?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008, at A13
(assessing the possibility of the adoption of a preventive detention law); Michael B.
Mukasey, Op-Ed., Al QaedaDetainees and Congress's Duty, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21 2008, at
A23; Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, Don't Repackage Gitmo!, NATION, Dec. 15, 2008, at 8
(arguing against the creation of a national security court or a preventive detention law); Jack
Goldsmith & Benjamin Wittes, Nuts and Deadbolts: A Blueprint for the Closure of
Guantanamo Bay, SLATE, Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2206229/ (proposing the
creation of a national security court).
7. The order itself recognizes the ongoing habeas cases brought by many of the men at
Guantdnamo. Exec. Order No. 13,492, § 2(c), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4897 (recognizing that the
Guantinamo detainees "have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" and
that "most" have filed petitions).
8. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2008) (ordering the release
of five petitioners and denying the writ for a sixth petitioner).
9. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that foreign national detainees held at GuantAnamo
have a constitutional right to habeas corpus).
10. Id. at 2269, 2277.
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The decision guaranteed detainees a legal means to challenge their
detention and was heralded as an "immediate" legal solution for the men
held at Guantdnamo. 11 In reality, however, Boumediene is one of a very
few petitioners who has been given a hearing. 12 The vast majority of
petitions have been slowed by arguments over the required substance and
procedures of these habeas hearings.1 3 Even for Boumediene, the solution
was far from immediate: his long legal battle began in February of 2002,
taking over six and a half years to reach the merits of the case.
As of December 31, 2008, the government had filed documents laying
out the purported factual bases for detention in 190 of the pending cases at
Guantdnamo.14 While this represents significant progress in some respects,
these documents have been either entirely classified or partially classified
and partially protected. 15 Where classified evidence is used, it cannot be

11. See Josh White & Del Quentin Wilber, Detainees Now lHave Access to Federal
Court, WASH. POST, June 13, 2008, at A4 (describing Boumediene as "immediately giv[ing]
the detainees access to a federal court in Washington").
12. As of February 11, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has
heard ten petitions. Including the six petitioners in Boumediene v. Bush, the court has
granted the writ in six cases and denied issuance in four cases. See Al Bihani v. Obama, No.
05-1312, slip op. (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2009) (order denying writ of habeas corpus); El Gharani
v. Bush, No. 05-429, 2009 WL 88056 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009) (order granting writ of habeas
corpus); Al Alwi v. Bush, No. 05-2223, 2008 WL 5412289 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2008) (order
denying writ of habeas corpus); Sliti v. Bush, No. 05-429, slip op. (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2008)
(same).
13. Habeas cases are currently before Judges Thomas F. Hogan, Richard J. Leon, Emmet
G. Sullivan, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, John D. Bates, Reggie B. Walton, Richard W. Roberts,
James Robertson, Ellen S. Huvelle, Ricardo M. Urbina, Paul L. Friedman, Royce C.
Lamberth, and Henry H. Kennedy. Though cases before Judge Sullivan have also been
successful in moving forward, they have not moved to completion. Judge Hogan was
selected as coordinating judge to handle uniform procedural issues in the cases so that they
could be "addressed as expeditiously as possible as required by the Supreme Court in
Boumediene v. Bush." Resolution of the Executive Session (D.D.C. July 1, 2008), available
at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/public-docs/system/files/Guantanamo-Resolution07O108.pdf.
Judges Leon and Sullivan declined to transfer their cases.
14. Respondents' Status Report Regarding the Filing of Factual Returns for December
2008 and Request for Exception from Sequencing, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig.,
No. 08-442 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 2008). This Note uses the term "the government" to refer to
the Department of Justice generally. Where there are explicit policy variances between the
current administration of Barack Hussein Obama and that of former President George W.
Bush, the Note indicates this in the text.
15. Protected information is information that is not classified but is still sensitive and
"not suitable for public filing" and also often cannot be shown to petitioners themselves. In
re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 143, 147 (D.D.C. 2008) (outlining
procedures for access to classified protected information and procedures for counsel to
access detainees). See generally Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. III §
3 (2006) (describing the purpose of protective orders). The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure also provide for the use of protective orders. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1) ("At any
time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant
other appropriate relief. The court may permit a party to show good cause by a written
statement that the court will inspect ex parte. If relief is granted, the court must preserve the
entire text of the party's statement under seal."). In the case of the factual returns at
Guantdnamo, detainees have been allowed to view the protected portions.
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accessed by the public or the petitioners themselves. 16 The result is that,
even for the ten petitions heard by the District Court for the District of
Columbia, none of the petitioners have seen the classified factual returns or
been present for the hearings. 17
The significance of the habeas hearings goes beyond that of the rights of
the men currently held at Guantdinamo. As the Supreme Court articulated
most recently in Boumediene, the writ is a "time-tested device . . . to
maintain the 'delicate balance of governance' that is itself the surest
safeguard of liberty."' 18 The writ of habeas corpus is the only individual
right included in the main body of the U.S. Constitution, independent of the
Bill of Rights.' 9 Understanding how habeas corpus, as articulated in the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution, is enforced, and the scope of its
protection, is a precondition to assuring its continued enforcement and to
preserving the liberty and personal freedom the writ was designed to
protect. Arguably, the precise mechanics of the writ become especially
important when protecting the rights of individuals imprisoned at the behest
of the President and on the basis of evidence that has, outside of the habeas
context, never been examined in court.
While there is much scholarship on the scope and mechanics of the writ
in general, this Note will look specifically at how the use of classified
evidence will impact district courts' "meaningful review" of petitioners'
habeas claims. Part L.A gives a brief history of the government's use of
Guantdnamo as a military prison in the wake of the attacks of September
11, 2001. Part I.B provides an overview of the history of the writ of habeas
corpus. Part I.C reviews the Supreme Court's jurisprudence borne of
challenges to the government's use of Guantdnamo for indefinite military
detention, including the Boumediene decision. Part I.D discusses the
practical and legal challenges presented by the use of classified information
as evidence against an individual. Part I.E looks at how the lower courts
have handled the issue of classified evidence in the habeas hearings that
have already gone forward. Part II examines three other contexts in which
procedures for the use of classified information have been legislated:
federal criminal courts, immigration cases, and the ongoing military
commissions at Guant~namo. In light of this examination, Part III argues
that a "meaningful review" of the Guantdnamo habeas petitions requires
16. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 148-51 (outlining
procedures for access to classified protected information and procedures for counsel to
access detainees); see also Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 334, pt. I, § 1.1(c) (1995),
reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 435 note (2000) ("Classified National Security
Information") (defining classified information as "information... determined pursuant to
this order ...

to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and . . . marked to

indicate its classified status when in documentary form").
17. See, e.g., Sliti, No. 05-429, slip op. at I (order denying petition for a writ of habeas
corpus); AlA/wi, 2008 WL 5412289, at *4 (same).
18. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 536 (2004)).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.").
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that the detainees themselves be given regulated access to the classified
information that is used as evidence against them. Specifically, this Note
recommends that the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) or a
CIPA-like statute be adopted in the habeas context. Such a statute would
allow for the uniform regulation of detainee access to the evidence against
them, while still safeguarding sensitive national security information.
I.

NATIONAL SECURITY, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, AND THE SPECIAL

CASE OF GUANTANAMO

Part I of this Note provides background on Guantdnamo as a national
security prison, as well as the legal and jurisprudential tensions that form a
backdrop to this issue. In doing so, Part I aims to create a foundation for
the analysis of the three frameworks for controlling access to classified
information that are explored in Part II.
A. A BriefHistory of Guant6namo as a National Security Prison
The Bush administration began using Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, as the
location for a military prison in January 2002.20 From the outset, the
purpose of moving prisoners to the facility at Guantdnamo was to detain
and interrogate individuals whom the Bush administration believed were a
threat to the United States and to isolate them from the outer world. 2 1 The
captors sought to create an atmosphere of "debility, dependence, and dread"
among prisoners. 22 In spite of the fact that detainees began arriving as early
as 2002, the military prohibited detainee access to counsel until 2004,
following the Supreme Court decision of Rasul v. Bush, which guaranteed
the men a right to habeas. 23 Boumediene v. Bush dealt with the claims of
only six of the 248 men still detained at Guantdnamo. 24 The current
population totals less than one-third of the total number of men who have

20. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (Dec. 16, 2008),
available at http://www.defenselink.milReleases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=12394 (citing the

current, approximate population of the prison).
21. JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 22
(2006).

22. Id. at 38-40 (describing the use of isolation, stress positions and other tactics to
create this atmosphere).
23. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); infra notes 50-54 (discussing the rights
articulated in Rasul); see also MOAZZAM BEGG, ENEMY COMBATANT: MY IMPRISONMENT AT
GUANTANAMO, BAGRAM, AND KANDAHAR 267-75 (2006) (describing his visit with Gita
Gutierrez, the first habeas lawyer to visit Guantdnamo).
24. On December 16, 2008, the Department of Defense announced the transfer of the
three of these men to Bosnia and estimated that the prison is holding "approximately 250"
detainees. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Defense, supra note 20. At the time of this release,
"approximately 60" other detainees had been determined "eligible for transfer or release" but
remain detained. Id. For a comprehensive report on the number of detainees held at
Guantdnamo at various points, current through December 18, 2008, see BENJAMIN WITTES ET
AL.,

BROOKINGS

INST.,

EMPIRICAL STUDY (2008).

THE CURRENT DETAINEE

POPULATION AT GUANTANAMO:

AN
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passed through. 25 At its peak, the detention centers at Guantdnamo held
26
779 men and juvenile males.
Under former President George W. Bush, the government asserted that
the men were lawfully held, claiming broad authority to detain from the
President's inherent authority in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. 27 To
the extent that petitioners and courts did not accept unilateral presidential
authority to detain, the government argued that Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF) represents congressional authorization for the
28
detainment.
B. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
The primary purpose of the writ of habeas corpus, called the Great Writ
at common law, is to "test[] the legality of [the] cause" of commitment. 29
Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently described it, the writ is a "critical
check on the Executive" and guarantees that individuals are only detained
in accordance with the law. 30 Originally, the King of England used the writ
of habeas corpus to review the jurisdiction of lower courts. 3 1 A central
court could compel the production of prisoners who had been arrested by
the lower courts and challenge their detention. 32 As the writ evolved, "all
persons within the realm who [were] under the protection of the Crown"
could take advantage of the writ and challenge their detention. 33 Literally
25. See WITTES ET AL., supra note 24, at 3; see also BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE
HOW A BAND OF YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED THE PRESIDENT-AND WON (2005)
(documenting the history of Guantdnamo as the site of indefinite detention of Haitian
refugees throughout the 1990s).
COURT:

26. WITrES ET AL., supra note 24, at 6.

27. The government has filed several different documents arguing its authority to detain.
Each contains a variation of these basic propositions. See, e.g., Respondents' Statement of
Legal Justification for Detention at 3, Gherebei v. Bush, No. 04-1164 (D.D.C. Nov. 13,
2008); Government's Brief Regarding Preliminary and Procedural Framework Issues at 13,
Batarfi v. Bush, No. 08-00864 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2008). In recent briefs from Barack
Obama's Department of Justice, the government has shifted its argument to focus more on
the Law of War, though still claiming authority to detain. See Respondents' Memorandum
Regarding the Government's Detention Authority to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In
re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
28. See, e.g., Respondents' Legal Justification for Detention at 3, Gherebei,No. 04-1164
(D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2008). The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)
authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided" in the
September 11 terrorist attacks. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 note (West 2008)).
29. R. J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 5 (2d ed. 1989).

30. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 553 U.S. 289,
301 (2001)).
31. See SHARPE, supra note 29, at 5; Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ:
Judicial Review, Due Process, and the Detention of Alleged Terrorists as Enemy
Combatants, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 39, 68-69 (2005).
32. See Priester supra note 31, at 6869 (describing the original mechanics of the writ).
33. Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996
Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2523 (1998) (quoting I1 HALSBURY'S LAW OF
ENGLAND 25 (3d ed. 1955)).

"MEANINGFUL REVIEW" AT GUANTANAMO

2009]

2675

meaning "bring the body forward," a prisoner's petition for the writ would
lead to his production in court. 34 Historically the writ of habeas corpus has
been used to challenge almost any kind of detention in an effort to counter
the potential for wrongful detention and to guarantee liberty for those
"under the protection of the crown." 35 This included executive detention in
the absence of a charge or conviction. 36 In addition to its long history, the
importance of the writ is further emphasized by its inclusion in Article I of
37
the U.S. Constitution.
The precise scope and availability of the writ in a novel situation is
traditionally determined by its historical use and purpose. 38 Habeas is
recognized as a flexible remedy that can be adapted to nearly any form of
detention. 39 Specifically, the Supreme Court has stated clearly that it is not
"a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its
40
grand purpose."
The rights safeguarded by the writ are fundamentally the same now as at
the founding of our nation: freedom from unlawful detention and the
government's unlawful exertion of power.4 1 Prior to the Guantdnamo
detentions, modem habeas corpus jurisprudence focused largely on federal
42
court review of state criminal cases sought by prisoners postconviction.
34. See STEVEN T. WAX, KAFKA COMES TO AMERICA: FIGHTING FOR JUSTICE IN THE WAR
ON TERROR 24 (2008) (giving a brief history of habeas corpus).
35. Hafetz, supra note 33, at 2523 (citing 11 HALSBURY'S LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note
33, at 25).
36. See Brown v. Allen 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result)
("The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities
without judicial trial."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction,Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2037
(2007) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)); see also Hafetz, supra note 33, at
2520 (describing habeas at common law in "noncriminal confinement" cases as allowing
challenges to jurisdiction, legal error, abuse of discretion, and factual findings).
37. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require
it."); see also Hafetz, supra note 33, at 2515 (describing the historical evolution of the
Suspension Clause); Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension ClauseAfter INS v.
St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 555.(2002) (analyzing the Suspension Clause as it has
evolved historically and how it has been challenged in recent years).
38. See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 ("[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension
Clause protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789."' (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664
(1996))); Hafetz, supra note 33, at 2516 ("It is well established that the common law history
of habeas corpus is integral to the Suspension Clause.").
39. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302 (finding that, at common law, the writ of habeas allowed
challenges to "[e]xecutive and private detention in civil cases as well as criminal" and
covered challenges based on errors of law and the wrongful application of statutes whether
or not based on constitutional error).
40. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (upholding the use of the writ to
challenge parole restrictions that "significantly confine and restrain" freedom and therefore
act to keep petitioner in "custody" within the meaning of the writ).
41. See Hafetz, supra note 33, at 2525 (citing WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY

OF

HABEAS

CORPUS

40-48

(1980))

(describing

executive

detention

as

"implicat[ing] the core function" of the writ).
42. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372
(1977); see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2037 ("American lawyers who came of
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The Guantdnamo petitioners, however, seek to rely on the writ of habeas
corpus for its most traditional purpose: challenging executive detention.
The Guantdinamo detainees bring their petitions under the codification of
the common-law writ at 28 U.S.C. § 2241.43 The petitions allege that the
detainees are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States."' 44 Under the statute, after the writ is filed, and if the
court has jurisdiction, the government must produce a "return" stating the
factual and legal basis for the detention of the petitioner. 45 In recognition
of the great injustice done to a petitioner wrongfully imprisoned, the statute
contemplates a speedy process: the respondent shall issue their return
within three days of the claim. 46 If the application for the return reveals any
issues that cannot be resolved as a matter of law, the court must then set a
date for a hearing. 47 The petitioner is given an opportunity to respond to, or
traverse, these allegations. 48 Again contemplating a rapid legal response,
the statute requires that the court should "summarily hear and determine the
facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require. ' 49 For reasons
explored below, however, the rapid process envisioned by Congress in the
habeas statute has taken years to be triggered in the Guantdnamo cases.
C. Battle of the Branches.- Supreme Court Rulings and Executive and
CongressionalResponse
Part I.C of this Note explains the novel and complicated legal history of
the Guantdnamo detainees and their right to habeas corpus. Beginning with
the first of the habeas petitions to come out of Guantdnamo, Rasul v. Bush,
Part I.C looks at each Supreme Court decision and any executive,
congressional, or military response that followed until the July 2008
decision of Boumediene v. Bush guaranteed the constitutional right of
habeas corpus.
1. Rasul: Extending Habeas to Guantdnamo Detainees
The habeas petition brought on behalf of Safiq Rasul, a noncitizen
detainee captured in Afghanistan, was the first in the line of Supreme Court
cases addressing the scope of detainees' legal right to challenge their
detention in U.S. courts. In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court established
age since World War II may associate the writ with federal court relitigation of constitutional
issues raised by prisoners convicted in state courts."); Priester, supra note 31, at 69
(describing contemporary habeas corpus law as "concerned almost exclusively with
challenges to incarceration pursuant to a judgment issued by a duly constituted court for
conviction for a criminal offense").
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
44. Id. § 2241(c)(3).
45. Id. § 2243 ("The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return
certifying the true cause of the detention.").
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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that federal district courts have jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings
brought by Guantdnamo detainees. 50 The Court was explicit that this
jurisdiction would allow district courts to hear suits brought under the
federal habeas statute, § 2241.51 While recognizing that habeas had
evolved since 1789, the Court explained that, "'at its historical core, the
writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of
Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
strongest.' ' 52 The Court found that Guantdnamo's location outside of the
United States was irrelevant because Guantdnamo is under the "complete
jurisdiction and control" of the United States. 53 Further, because the federal
habeas statute "draws no distinction between Americans and aliens held in
federal custody, there is little reason to think that Congress intended the
geographical coverage of the statute to vary depending on the detainee's
'54
citizenship.
Nine days after the Supreme Court decided Rasul, then-Deputy Director
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced the creation of Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (CSRTs). 55 The stated purpose of the tribunals was to
determine whether the individual detained at Guantdnamo was, as accused,
an enemy combatant, 56 and to provide him with an opportunity to challenge
his status. 57 On December 30, 2005, Congress passed the Detainee
50. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 467-68 (2004) (holding that "the federal courts have
jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of
individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing" who are held at Guantdnamo).
51. Id. at 481 ("Aliens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to
invoke the federal courts' authority under § 2241.").
52. Id. at 474 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).
53. Id. at 480-81 (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba,
Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the "express
terms" of Cuba's lease of Guant~tnamo to the United States as allowing complete jurisdiction
and control over the land, at the discretion of the United States).
54. Id. at 501 (finding no evidence of congressional intent to distinguish between
citizens and noncitizens in the habeas statute and that there is federal court jurisdiction to
hear the claim of a citizen held at Guantinamo).
55. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to Gordon R.
England, Sec'y of the Navy (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter DoD Memo], available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; see also BEGG, supra note
23, at 277 (describing the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) experience from the
perspective of a detainee).
56. Each judge at the district court level has handled the definition of "enemy
combatant" independently. After briefing by counsel, Judge Leon in the Boumediene case
adopted the definition of enemy combatant as any "individual who was part of or supporting
Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a
belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."
Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008) (order defining enemy
combatant). In the CSRT proceedings, an enemy combatant is anyone "part of or supporting
Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners." DoD Memo, supra note 55, at 1.
57. See DoD Memo, supra note 55, at I ("[A]ll detainees shall be notified of the
opportunity to contest designation as an enemy combatant in the proceeding described
herein ....
"). The CSRT process assigns each detainee a "personal representative" who
represents the detainee in front of "three neutral commissioned officers of the U.S. Armed
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Treatment Act (DTA), stripping federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over
the men at Guantdnamo and creating a very narrow form of appellate
review for the CSRTs and military commissions.5 8 In practice, the CSRT
process has been widely criticized. 59
2. Hamdi: Defining the Terms of Habeas for Enemy Combatants Held
Within the United States
While Rasul dealt with a detainee's right to challenge his detention,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 6° focused on the process by which such a challenge
should be heard and the substantive standards that govern the government's
ability to detain. 6 1 Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen held in military
detention, sought to challenge his imprisonment under the habeas corpus

Forces." Id. Detainees are provided with unclassified versions of the basis for their
detention. Id. at 2. They are not shown any classified evidence. Id. They are given the
opportunity to call "reasonably available" witnesses and to question witnesses called by the
tribunal. Id. The memorandum clearly states that it does not "create any right or benefit." Id.
at 4.
58. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat.
2739 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2006) ("Matters Relating to
Detainees")). The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) established a narrow form of appellate
review to take place solely in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 2742.
DTA cases allow review of enemy combatant status based on two narrowly defined
questions:
(1) Did the military comply with CSRT procedures and is the status
determination supported by a preponderance of evidence? (2) To the extent the Constitution
and laws of the United States apply, were the procedures and standards of the CSRT applied
in a manner consistent with the Constitution? Id. The Justice Department has argued that by
authorizing habeas petitions, Boumediene effectively undid the power of federal courts to
hear DTA appeals.
See Posting
of Lyle Denniston
to SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/primer-on-boumedienes-week-of-reckoning/ (Nov. 19, 2008,
14:42 EST) (calling Bismullah et al. v. Gates a "showdown over the fate of the DTA
system"). See generally Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism
Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-CriminalDivide, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 369, 406
(2008) (summarizing recent developments in DTA cases); Arsalan M. Suleman, Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 257, 264 (2006) ("The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has exclusive, but limited, jurisdiction to hear appeals to
review the final decisions of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and final decisions of
the Military Commissions.").
59. See, e.g., In re Guantdinamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d. 443, 468 (D.D.C.
2005) (holding that the CSRTs violate due process); MARGULIES, supra note 21, at 159-70
(listing and describing the due process problems inherent in CSRT procedure); Kent Roach
& Gary Trotter, Miscarriagesof Justice in the War Against Terror, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv.
967, 1020-32 (2005) (listing and discussing in detail the reasons for high risk of error in the
CSRT process). As Benjamin Wittes described, "[t]he CSRT... hearings are not judicial
proceedings. Government allegations lack the specificity, detail, and supporting evidence
typical of criminal trials. Allegations are often vague and key terms.., go undefined."
WITTES ET AL., supra note 24, at 6. Further pointing to the weakness of such hearings,
several CSRTs found that detainees were not enemy combatants, only to be reconvened and
find the opposite. Id. at 6-7.
60. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
61. Id. at 510-11 (comparing the government position that Hamdi was an "enemy
combatant" with his father's claim that he was in Afghanistan doing "relief work" and that
his detention violates at least his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
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statute, § 2241.62 The government argued Hamdi's status, determined by
the Executive, should be reviewed only for legal sufficiency and that there
should be no review of the specific facts alleged by the government to
justify detention. 6 3 The Court rejected this view and called for a factfocused review that allowed for an assessment of the individual petitioners'
case. 64 In theory, at least, this promised a more searching level of review.
While the government argued that the Court should only review the basis
for detention on a "some evidence" standard, 65 Hamdi argued that
individuals held by the Executive are due "recourse to some proceeding
before a neutral tribunal to determine ... the ... justifications for that
detention have basis in fact and warrant in law" and urged process at the
level of a traditional criminal trial. 66 After balancing national security
concerns and the petitioner's due process rights, the Court determined that
"neither the process proposed by the Government nor" the criminal trialtype proceedings endorsed by the district court "strikes the proper
constitutional balance." 6 7 The Court relied on the hallmark, three-part
Mathews v. Eldridge6 8 test to reach this conclusion. 69 The Mathews test, as
it will be called throughout this Note, weighs (1) the interest of the
individual, (2) the risk that this interest will be erroneously deprived by the
procedure in question, and (3) the government's interest at stake in the
procedure. 70 The Court held that a citizen-detainee is due fair "notice of the
factual basis" for his detention and "a fair opportunity to rebut the
71
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."
Addressing national security concerns, the Court held that, "aside from
these core elements, enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to

62. See id. at 511 (explaining that Hamdi's petition was brought under § 2241 by his

father as his "next friend").
63. See id. at 527 (rejecting the argument that "further factual exploration is unwarranted
and inappropriate" because of separation of powers concerns and the limited role of the court
in areas of military concern).
64. See id. (characterizing the impact of a strictly legal inquiry as "eliminat[ing] entirely

any individual process, restricting the courts to investigating only whether legal
authorization exists for the broader detention scheme").
65. Under a "some evidence standard," courts focus "exclusively on the factual basis
supplied by the Executive to support its own determination." Superintendent, Mass. Corr.
Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-457 (1985). There is no "weighing of the evidence" and
instead, the Court is called upon to assess only whether there is any information in the record
to support the Executive's conclusion. Id.
66. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528 (describing petitioner's argument that without a hearing and
an opportunity to present counterevidence he would not receive meaningful judicial review).
67. Id. at 532.
68. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
69. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
70. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. As measured by the Mathews v. Eldridge test, an
evaluation of the risk of erroneous deprivation of an individual's right includes the "probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Id. The government's
interest includes "the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id.
71. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (holding that a citizen-detainee in military custody has a
statutory right to habeas corpus).
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alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of
ongoing military conflict. '72 Though Hamdi applies to U.S. citizens, rather
than aliens, the decision is significant as the only decision interpreting §
2241 as it should be applied to detainees suspected of terrorism held in
military custody.
The decision is also significant because of its reliance on INS v. St. Cyr, a
case explicitly finding that constitutional habeas rights extend to aliens
seeking review of an administrative order of removal and, further, that not
allowing full and robust habeas review in this context would be a violation
of the Suspension Clause. 73 Thus, St. Cyr clarified that the constitutional
74
guarantee of habeas applies to noncitizens.
3. Hamdan: Articulating Minimum Standards for Military Commissions
Shortly after September 11, 2001, former President George W. Bush
signed a military order authorizing the convening of military tribunals to try
alleged terrorists. 75 On the basis of this order, the U.S. Department of
Defense then published Military Commission Order Number One, a set of
regulations governing the military commissions. 76 Military proceedings
were initiated against Salim Ahmed Hamdan under this military order, but
before a trial could commence, the framework for these commissions was
72. Id. at 533-34 (suggesting that hearsay and a burden-shifting scheme that rests on a
presumption, with a "fair opportunity for rebuttal" in favor of the government's evidence,
might be acceptable alterations to traditional standards). The Court intimated that "[t]here
remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an
appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal." Id. at 538. In addition,
the Court held that affidavits by government personnel would be accepted as long as there
was an opportunity for detainees to present their own evidence in rebuttal. Id.
73. Id at. 525 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (holding that the denial of
habeas corpus review of an alien's administrative removal order would be a violation of the
Suspension Clause)).
74. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314 (finding that the absence of(1) an alternative forum to
review the issues of law presented in St. Cyr's case and (2) proof of Congress's clear
intention to preclude habeas review of the legal question, "strongly counsels against
adopting a construction that would raise serious constitutional questions").
75. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002).
76. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf.
The legal and ethical
standards promulgated in the first military commission order, while not an issue here, have
been strongly criticized. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers issued an
ethical opinion advising against civilian lawyer participation in the tribunals. See Nat'l Ass'n
of Crim. Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 03-04 (2003); see also Mary Cheh,
Should Lawyers Participatein Rigged Systems? The Case of the Military Commissions, 1 J.
NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 375, 375 (2005) (arguing that National Association of Criminal

Defense Lawyers' refusal to endorse participation in the military commissions was the "wise
and preferred" route); David L. Herman, A Dish Best Not Served at All: How Foreign
Military War Crimes Suspects Lack Protection Under United States and InternationalLaw,
172 MIL. L. REV. 40 (2002); Neal K. Katayl & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 11l YALE. L.J. 1259 (2002). For scholarship
supporting the commissions, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional
Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 249 (2002).
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invalidated by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 77 The Hamdan
Court also ruled that the DTA, enacted after Rasul to strip the district courts
of jurisdiction to hear detainee habeas claims, could not be applied
retroactively to habeas cases initiated prior to the passage of the DTA. 78
In direct response, Congress again attempted to divest federal district
courts of their ability to hear detainee habeas claims, this time through the
enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). 79 In addition
to providing new standards for the military commissions, the MCA
suspended the writ of habeas corpus for alien detainees by creating another
addendum to § 2241. 8 0 It was this provision that the Supreme Court found
81
invalid in Boumediene.
4. Boumediene: Guaranteeing Habeas for Guantdnamo Detainees and
Requiring a "Meaningful Review"
Boumediene found the MCA's addendum to § 2241 to be an unlawful
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 82 In striking this provision, the
Court reiterated its earlier holding in Rasul that the Guantdnamo detainees
are due "the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus."8 3 The
Boumediene Court rested its finding on the constitutional provision

prohibiting suspension.8 4 The Court explained that the "habeas court must
have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause
for detention and the Executive's power to detain." 85 While the Court did

77. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court found that the commissions and procedures
authorized by the executive in Military Order No. I were not properly constituted under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and not authorized by Congress. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2791 (2006) ("[W]e conclude that the 'practicability'
determination the President has made is insufficient to justify variances from the procedures
governing courts-martial [as required by the UCMJ]."); see also James Nicholas Boeving,
The Right to Be Present Before Military Commissions and Federal Courts: Protecting
National Security in an Age of Classified Information, 30 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 463,
471-78 (2007) (discussing the Hamdan holding and its ramifications for further litigation).
78. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764-69 (assessing and rejecting the government's argument
that the DTA acted to strip federal-court jurisdiction over habeas cases filed before its
passage).
79. See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w (2006); see also Boeving,
supra note 77, at 471-78.
80. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)(1) (West 2006), invalidatedby Boumediene v. Bush, 128
S. Ct. 2229 (2008) ("[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained
as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination."). Section 2241(e) also stripped
all courts of any jurisdiction to hear cases against "the United States or its agents relating to
any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien
who was or is detained by the United States." Id. The validity of this section is currently
being contested.
81. See infra Part I.C.4 (discussing Boumediene).
82. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
83. Id. at 2277.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2269.
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not specify the procedural protections due to the detainees, the Court did
reiterate that habeas is an "adaptable" remedy, the precise scope and nature
86
of which "change depending upon the circumstances."
The Court concluded that the level of review due in a habeas petition is
related to the level of procedural safeguards already conferred upon the
detainee at the point of his challenge. 87 The Court looked at the "sum total
of procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and
collateral. '88 The Court concluded that where individuals seeking review
have been given no, or only the most superficial, review, habeas must allow
for a more searching review. 89 Specifically, the Supreme Court found that
the court conducting habeas must have "some authority to assess the
sufficiency of the Government's evidence against the detainee" 90 and to
"consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not introduced during the
91
earlier proceeding."
Looking at the CSRT and appeals process established by the DTA, 92 the
Court determined four specific ways in which the procedures therein were
flawed and prevented the CSRT from being an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus. 9 3 All four problems show a concern for the petitioner's
ability to rebut the factual basis of his detention: 94 (1) the petitioner's
limited ability to present evidence at the CSRT, (2) the petitioner's lack of
counsel, (3) the petitioner's lack of knowledge of the most critical
allegations against him, and (4) the use of hearsay and the petitioner's
inability to confront witnesses against him.95 Because of the inadequacy of
the underlying CSRT procedure, the Court found that detainees 9 have a
"constitutionally required" right to supplement the record of review. 6
The Court identified other aspects of the CSRT process that prevent it
from being an adequate habeas substitute. For example, the Court found
that the CSRTs were "closed and accusatorial," 97 and "lack[ing]...
86. Id. at 2267.
87. Id. at 2268 ("The idea that the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends
upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings accords with our test for procedural adequacy in
the due process context." (citing Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976))).
88. Id. at 2269.
89. Id. ("Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after being
tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing.").
90. Id. at 2270.
91. Id.
92. For a brief background on the DTA, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
93. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274 (describing the CSRTs as an "inadequate" substitute
for habeas corpus review).
94. See id. at 2269 (identifying "constraints upon the detainee's ability to rebut the
factual basis for the Government's assertion" as the "most relevant" concerns about the
validity of the CSRT for the purposes of assessing the adequacy of the CSRT as a habeas
substitute).
95. See id. (listing problems with the CSRT process and calling the right to confront
witnesses in CSRTs "more theoretical than real").
96. Id. at 2270 (recognizing that because the CSRT process was not an adversarial one,
detainees cannot be held responsible for the information, or lack thereof, on the record).
97. Id. (quoting Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
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necessary adversarial character." 98 The CSRTs did not give petitioners
99
notice of the "most critical allegations that the Government relied upon"
in justifying their detention and did not provide detainees with a "means to
find or present evidence to challenge the Government's case." 100 The Court
also noted that detainees were allowed access only to the unclassified
evidence held by the government. 101
Alongside these criticisms of the CSRT process, the Court recognized the
government's legitimate interest in "protecting sources and methods of
intelligence gathering" through the use of classified information.1 0 2 The
Court was careful to note that the judge reviewing the petition must be
mindful of "the dangers the detention in these cases was intended to
prevent."' 1 3 Indeed, the Court suggested that lower courts consider
accommodations that would be made to "reduce the burden" that habeas
hearings would inherently place on the military. 10 4 Moderating this point
slightly, the Court was careful to point out that any such accommodations
10 5
should not "impermissibly dilut[e] the protections of the writ."
D. BalancingIndividualRights and NationalSecurity: The Challengeof
ClassifiedEvidence
Classified information is defined by the government as information that
"require[s] protection against unauthorized disclosure."' 0 6 Classified
information is designated as such unilaterally by the Executive and other
branches of the government. 10 7 Authority to classify information comes
through an authorization in writing from the President, agency heads, 0or8
other individuals designated by the President to classify information.'
Information can be classified into three categories: confidential, secret, or
top-secret. 109 Once categorized, classified information can only be

98. Id. at 2273.
99. Id. at 2269.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2276.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 334, pt. 1, § 1.1(c) (1995), reprinted as
amended in 50 U.S.C. § 435 note (2000) ("Classified National Security Information"); see
also Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. III § 1 (2006) (defining classified
information as "any information or material that has been determined by the United States
Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security").
107. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (explaining that courts themselves may
not order declassification and disclosure of classified national security information); United
States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215, 1217 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he Government ...may determine
what information is classified. A defendant cannot challenge this classification. A court
cannot question it.").
108. 3 C.F.R. at 335, pt. I, § 1.1(g).
109. Id. at 335-36, pt. I, § 1.3(a)(1)-(3).
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accessed by individuals who are deemed1 eligible
for access and are found to
0
have a "need to know" the information.
The executive order allowing classification contains very specific limits
on the kind of information that can be classified and the length of time that
information can be classified. I"
While the specificity of the rules
surrounding classification seems to suggest a tightly controlled
classification process, the overclassification of documents is a widely
recognized problem."12 The number of classified documents grows
regularly, and in 2005, classification had reached the rate of 125 documents
113
a minute.
In a habeas case, the petitioner is necessarily unable to access any
classified information relied on by the government. The resulting impact
on the petitioner's ability to defend himself is visible in the now-infamous
dialogue that took place at the CSRT of Bosnian-Algerian detainee Mustafa
114
Ait Idir:
Idir was asked to respond to a charge that he had "associated with a
known Al Qaida operative" while living in Bosnia. "Give me his name,"
Idir said.
Tribunal President: I do not know.
Idir: How can I respond to this?

110. See id; see also id. at 347, pt. IV, § 4.1(c) (defining a "need-to-know" as "requir[ing]
access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and
authorized governmental function").
11. See id. at 337, pt. I, § 1.5(a)-(g) (listing categories of information that are open to
classification, including military plans, weapons systems, foreign government information,
intelligence activities, and others); id. at 337, § 1.6(a)-(b) (directing that a specific date or
event for declassification should be selected at the time of classification, and that where a
specific date cannot be set, the document should be marked for declassification in ten years).
But see id. § 1.6(c) (stating that an original classifying authority can extend the duration of
classification for successive periods, not to exceed more than ten years at a time).
112. See, e.g., SERRIN TURNER & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN TERRORISM TRIALS 5, 32-34 (2005) (discussing the problem of
over-classification); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the Classified Information
ProceduresAct, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 312-13 (1986) (describing the classification system
as having a "well-documented" problem with unnecessary overclassification); Ellen C.
Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III Courts, FISA, CIPA
and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 203, 224 n.97 (2006) ("It is
widely recognized that 'the Federal Government exhibits a proclivity for over-classification
of information."' (quoting Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J.,
concurring))).
113. Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 224 & n.98 (citing Editorial, The Dangerous
Comfort of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at A20) (presenting evidence that since
2001, the Executive has doubled the number of documents that are classified to fifteen
million a year while simultaneously expanding upon the number of governmental offices
empowered to classify them).
114. Ait Idir was one of the five men recently ordered to be released by the District Court
in Washington, D.C., in the Boumediene habeas decisions. See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F.
Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2008).
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Tribunal President:
Qaida?
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Did you know of anyone that was a member of Al

Idir: No, no.... This is something the interrogators told me a long while
ago. I asked the interrogators to tell me who this person was. Then I
could tell you if I might have known this person but not if this person was
a terrorist. Maybe I knew this person as a friend. Maybe it was a person
that worked with me. Maybe it was a person that was on my team. But I
do not know if this person is Bosnian, Indian, or whatever. If you tell me
the name, then I can respond and defend myself against this accusation.
Tribunal President: We are asking you the questions and we need you to
1
respond to what is on the unclassified summary. 15
Later in the same sitting, Idir explained further:
You tell me I am from Al Qaida, but I am not an Al Qaida. I don't have
any proof to give you except to ask you to catch Bin Laden and ask him if
I am a part of Al Qaida.... What should be done is you should give me
evidence regarding these accusations because I am
not able to give you
1
any evidence. I can just tell you no, and that is it. 16
As exhibited here, it is very difficult to confront secret information.
Based in part on this concern, American courts have prohibited the use of
classified information by the government in adversarial contexts in all but
the most extreme cases. 117 As the Supreme Court has recognized, it is a
basic tenet of our jurisprudence "that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact
findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is
untrue."1 1 8 In the criminal context, it is a "firmly held main rule" that a
court will not decide the merits of a case based on submissions made
outside of the presence of defense counsel and the defendant." 9 At the
same time, the courts have long recognized the need for the government to

115. MARGULIES, supra note 21, at 163.
116. Id. at 164.
117. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("It is therefore the
firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex
parte, in camera submissions."); id. at 1060 ("It is a hallmark of our adversary system that
we safeguard party access to the evidence tendered in support of a requested court
judgment."); United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 18, 21 (D.D.C. 2006) ("[C]ourts
routinely express their disfavor with ex parte proceedings and permit such proceedings only
in the rarest of circumstances.").
118. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (finding that the Department of
Defense was not empowered to use confidential information to deprive an individual of his
job without explicit authorization from either the President or Congress because of the lack
of opportunities for confrontation and cross-examination afforded to the individual).
119. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1061 (describing the exceptions to the main rule as "both few
and tightly contained").
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safeguard information that, if released, might cause harm to the national
20
security. 1
The Supreme Court has recognized that the level of procedural
protections extended to an individual directly relates to his ability to fairly
and directly challenge the case against him. 12 1 This is particularly true
when dealing with evidence that possesses an exculpatory value and can be
gained through confrontation but that cannot be gained through another
reasonably available method. 122 Indeed, in the criminal context, "state and
federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish
rules excluding evidence from criminal trials," but such rules cannot be
either "'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve."'123
An evidentiary exclusion becomes "arbitrary" or
"disproportionate" where it "infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the
accused," for example the right of the defendant to testify. 124 Such an
interest is arguably implicated when a defendant's lawyer cannot discuss
evidence with the accused and, as a result, the defendant cannot directly
25
address the evidence against him. 1
More generally, classified information presents problems of accuracy and
truth. Like all information acquired by investigations and interviews,

120. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008) ("[T]he Government
has a legitimate interest in protecting sources and methods of intelligence gathering .... );
CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) ("'The Government has a compelling interest in
protecting... the secrecy of information important to our national security .... ' (quoting
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam))).
121. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) ("Whether rooted directly in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."' (citations omitted)
(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984))).
122. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 (finding no constitutional deprivation where defendant
was denied evidence that was reasonably available by means other than confrontation and
was not exculpatory); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (noting that the
right to cross-examine or call a witness "is implicit in the constitutional right of
confrontation, and helps assure the 'accuracy of the truth-determining process' (quoting
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970))).
123. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483
U.S. 44, 56 (1987)).
124. Id.; see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 (discussing the inability of the court to arbitrarily
deny a witness the opportunity to testify or to arbitrarily exclude relevant pieces of
testimony); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (holding that the exclusion of evidence "critical" to
the defendant, coupled with the court's refusal to allow cross-examination of a key witness,
was a denial of due process); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (deciding that an
accused has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense and that arbitrary
denial of this right violates the compulsory process clause).
125. See, e.g., Brief of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Writ of Certiorari to the 4th Circuit, United States v.
Moussaoui, No. 06-4494 (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter NACDL Brief] (arguing that
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) procedures depriving defendant of his ability
to see evidence against him is a denial of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments);
Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 232 (arguing that the pervasive use of CIPA procedures is
"eroding fundamental Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights").
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classified information may be flawed or simply false. 126 The risk of false
reporting within the intelligence community was especially high in the
months and years following the attacks of September 11, 2001.127 There
was intense pressure on intelligence agencies to gather useable information
but new intelligence networks were not yet in place. 128 Where petitioners
are denied the opportunity to see information alleged against them, they are
"stripp[ed] ...of the ability to probe weaknesses in the Government's
evidence." 129 The process of classification thus threatens to turn a trial or
hearing into "an empty ritual drained of the adversarial features that are its
130
very reason for being."'
In addition, the use of classified information that is only available for
view by the attorney can cause immense stress to the attorney-client
relationship. 13 1 The judicial system of the United States has long
recognized that whether and to what extent a lawyer is able to communicate
with his client influences the lawyer's ability to craft a strong defense and
to engage forcefully in the adversarial system.132 The concerns reflected in
this recognition are particularly relevant in the context of the detainee
126. See Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret
Deportation Proceedings, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 28 (1996) ("[Tlhe risk of error is
greater, maybe even much greater, when a person is denied access to the full raw evidence
against him, leaving him incapable of testing the integrity of that evidence by crossexamination and rebuttal."); see also Petitioners' Public Traverse to the Government's
Return to the Petition for Habeas Corpus at 5, Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191
(D.D.C. 2008) (No. 04-1166) (citing Declaration of Arthur Brown at 5, Boumediene, 579 F.
Supp. 2d 191 (No. 04-1166) [hereinafter Brown Declaration] (describing raw intelligence
reports relied on by the government as "at best a basis for further inquiry")) (noting that the
government has recently acknowledged the unreliability of previously classified evidence).
127. See Brown Declaration, supra note 126, at 4 (describing the intelligence system as
"flooded with unreliable reports" following September I1,2001, and citing examples
through 2005).
128. See id. at 3 ("[T]he failure to provide some quality control to the raw data reported in
intelligence reports was always a concern .... The failure in quality control was most acute

with respect to raw data that had any relation (however remote) to possible terrorist
activities."); id. at 5 (estimating the existence of "tens of thousands-if not hundreds of
thousands" of intelligence reports of "little to no credibility").
129. TURNER& SCHULHOFER, supra note 112, at 6.
130. Id. (discussing the impact of classified documents in federal criminal cases); see
Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1962, 1979 (2005) ("The
use of secret evidence thus 'creates a one-sided process by which the protections of our
adversarial system are rendered impotent."' (quoting Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d
402, 413 (D.N.J. 1999))).
131. See David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guanthnamo,60 STAN. L. REV. 1981,
1994 (2008) ("Not only does the protective order create enormous and obvious practical
difficulties in preparing a legal case, it also precludes the lawyers from communicating
information that might allow them to establish trust." (citing Martha Rayner, Roadblocks to
Effective Representation of Uncharged, Indefinitely Imprisoned Clients at Guantanamo Bay
MilitaryBase, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 485, 489-90 (2007))).
132. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("'[T]he right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel."' (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970))); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954) ("[A] defendant must be
given a reasonable opportunity to. .. consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard
by counsel would be of little worth.").
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litigation where there so many external factors influencing the attorneyclient relationship.
For example, language barriers,133 cultural
134
differences,
the scarcity of attorney-client interaction due to the high
administrative and financial costs of visiting Guantdnamo, 135 and the
general and pervasive lack of trust in the U.S. government and judicial
system, 136 of which lawyers are seen as representatives, 137 are all stresses
on the attorney-client relationship. Prohibitions on detainee access to
information thus challenge trust and strain what is, in many cases, an
138
already weakened attorney-client relationship.
The government and its supporters argue that tight rules regulating use
of, and access to, classified information are predicates to protecting the very
system in which the U.S. judiciary operates and, indeed, the safety of the
nation.1 39 Principally, the government has a strong interest in protecting the
identification of its intelligence agents and sources.1 40 This interest is based
both in a pragmatic desire to maintain undercover channels of information
and a need to protect the life and health of agents. 14 1 The government is
133. See generally Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across
Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007) (assessing and discussing the difficulties
encountered when attorney and client speak different languages). The vast majority of
detainees on Guantidnamo speak little or no English and require a translator to work with
their American, English-speaking lawyers. See Luban, supra note 131, at 1992 (discussing
the difficulty and slowness imposed by the language difference).
134. See BEGG, supra note 23, at 270 (describing the concerns of a female attorney
visiting with a detainee); id. at 331 (describing the discomfort with Western, secular law felt
by some Islamic detainees).
135. See Luban, supra note 131, at 1989 (discussing the scarcity of seats on the plane, the
high cost of travel, the need to pay for and find interpreters, and other barriers to visiting
clients).
136. See id. at 1983 n.7 (quoting CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O'CLOCK FERRY TO THE
WINDWARD SIDE:

SEEKING JUSTICE IN GUANTANAMO BAY 192 (2007) (describing his

experience with meeting with clients at Guant~inamo)); see also BEGG, supra note 23, at 274
("The stringent military rules made it impossible for anyone to function in any normal clientlawyer terms.").
137. See BEGG, supra note 23, at 268-70 (describing anxiety before his first visit with a
habeas attorney).
138. See generally Luban, supra note 131, at 1992-98 (discussing the various obstacles to
the attorney-client relationship at Guantdnamo).
139. Stuart Taylor Jr., The Casefor a National Security Court, NAT'L J., Feb. 24, 2007, at
15 (arguing that terrorism-based "military detentions and trials should be very tightly
constrained by congressionally specified rules and done by experts," and that the prosecution
of terrorists in criminal courts leads to dangerous disclosures of classified information that
cripple intelligence gathering).
140. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A Global Approach to Secret Evidence: How Human
Rights Law Can Reform Our Immigration System, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 287, 321
(2008); see also D. Mark Jackson, Exposing Secret Evidence: Eliminatinga New Hardship
of United States Immigration Policy, 19 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 52 (2001) (describing the
government interest as "more concerned with the source of the information rather than with
the information itself').
141. See InternationalTerrorism: Threats and Responses: Hearing on H.R. 896 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,104th Cong. 21 (1995) (statement of William 0. Studeman,
Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency) ("We must protect those who would provide
us with vital information and protect methods critical to us, if we are to continue to keep
Americans out of harm's way."); see also Ramji-Nogales, supra note 140, at 322 (describing
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also rightly concerned about jeopardizing intelligence-based relationships
with other nations.1 42 As William 0. Studeman, acting Director of
Intelligence in 1995, explained, "Foreign governments simply will not
confide in us if we cannot keep their secrets."' 43 For similar reasons, the
government has a legitimate interest in maintaining the "appearance of
144
confidentiality" as well.
Where classified evidence is used in a trial, tight control of that
information lowers the risk of the accused being exposed to the information
and enabling its misuse. 145 If classified information is exposed to an
individual during the course of a hearing, there is the potential that the
individual will be acquitted, or released in the case of the habeas petitioners,
146
and then be able to distribute the information to other potential terrorists.
E. JudicialProgress Post-Boumediene
Judge Richard J. Leon of the Washington, D.C. District Court was the
first to rule on procedural issues in the Guantdnamo cases and,
subsequently, the first judge to rule on the merits of a habeas petition
brought by a detainee. 14 7 On November 20, 2008, after a weeklong
hearing, Judge Leon issued the first decision in a habeas case and
determined that the evidence against five of the six petitioners, "a classified
document from an unnamed source," was not enough to justify their
detention.1 48 Explaining his decision that reliance on this document could
not justify further detention of the petitioners, he declared that to "rest
[continued detention] on so thin a reed would be inconsistent with this
Court's obligation ... to protect petitioners from the risk of erroneous

a government interest in preventing the disclosure of intelligence sources to guard against

retaliation to officers, agents, and their families).
142. See Secret Evidence in the War on Terror,supra note 130, at 1980 (describing how
the release of classified evidence to an individual without clearance may undermine
relationships with foreign intelligence agencies on whom we rely for evidence).
143. InternationalTerrorism: Threats and Responses: Hearing on H.R. 896 Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 21 (1995) (statement of William 0. Studeman,
Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency).
144. See Note, supra note 130, at 1980; see also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985)
("'The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of

information ... and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation
of our foreign intelligence service."' (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3
(1980) (per curiam))).
145. See Boeving, supra note 77, at 511 (listing risks of accused terrorists being exposed
to classified information during a trial and the benefits of preventing disclosure).
146. See id. (noting that the risk presented by such a situation is much greater in the
context of an ongoing conflict with an unknown end).
147. William Glaberson, Judge Declares Five DetaineesHeld Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2008, at Al (describing Judge Leon's decision to release five of the six men involved in
the Boumediene petition for habeas corpus).
148. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2008) (order granting writ
as to five petitioners and denying writ as to one, explaining that the court could not
"adequately evaluate the credibility and reliability" of the sole, classified source relied upon
by the government to justify the detention of the men).
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detention."' 49 As an example of the problems with the evidence, Judge
Leon explained that he had no way to evaluate the circumstances in which it
was obtained. 150 With respect to the sixth petitioner, Belkacem Bensayah,
the court found that the government had presented "credible and reliable
evidence" showing that Bensayah planned to take up arms against the
United States and facilitated the travel plans of "unnamed others" to do the
same. 15 1 Because of the classified and closed nature of the proceedings,
Judge Leon could not make specific comments about his reasons for
52
evaluating the government's evidence as he did.1
Notably, Judge Leon's order establishing the procedures for the hearing
does not specifically address the treatment of classified information outside
of a brief statement that "petitioners are prohibited by law from listening to
the classified portions of the hearing."' 153 Judge Leon required the
government to provide unclassified versions of the factual return for the
petitioners but has made no other determinations in advance of hearings. 154
The public version of the amended factual returns providing the
government's justification for detention in the habeas case Boumediene v.
Bush was heavily redacted. 155 The returns took the form of a fifty-threepage narrative report with 134 exhibits. 156 Of the fifty-three pages,
approximately forty-eight were entirely redacted and almost all of the
remaining pages were partially blacked out.157 These unclassified versions
were the only evidence that Boumediene and the other petitioners saw.
Aside from two brief public sessions for opening and closing statements,
the petitioners were excluded from the entirety of their habeas hearing. 158
Since Boumediene's hearing, Judge Leon has ruled on the merits of three
other habeas petitions, using the same set of guiding principles. In two of
these cases, he found the detention of petitioners to be lawful. 159 In
Mohammed el-Gharani's hearing, the most recent of the three, the court
found that the government relied solely on statements by two detainees, the
149. Id. at 197 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 198.

152. Id.at 197 ("Unfortunately, due to the classified nature of the Government's
evidence, I cannot be more specific about the deficiencies of the Government's case at this
time.").
153. Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-1166, at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2008) (order governing

procedures).
154. See id.
155. See Amended Factual Return for Petitioners, Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (No.

04-1166) [hereinafter Boumediene Amended Return].
156. See Petitioners' Motion to Compel Signature of Unsigned "Narrative For
Petitioners" or, in the Alternative, to Strike the Unsigned Narrative and Exhibits at 2,
Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (No. 04-1166) (describing the redactions to the factual
return).
157. See Boumediene Amended Return, supra note 155.
158. Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 193 (explaining that after the opening statements the
court convened six days of "closed door sessions" to review classified evidence).
159. See Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008) (order denying petitioner's
petition for a writ of habeas); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2008) (same).
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reliability of which they did not prove and which Judge
Leon could not
16 1
ascertain. 160 On this basis, Judge Leon granted the writ.
On December 16, 2008, after much litigation, Judge Thomas F. Hogan
issued a procedural order in the consolidated cases. 162 Like Judge Leon's
order, the December 16 order requires the government to provide
1 63
petitioners with an unclassified version of the factual return.
Significantly, the order for the consolidated cases addresses standards for
the production of classified information. If compliance with exculpatory or
discovery obligations requires disclosing classified information, petitioner's
cleared counsel is due a copy of any such information. 164 Notably, there is
no requirement that an unclassified version be prepared for the petitioner,
and the order contemplates that there may be circumstances where the
government may object to the disclosure of classified information, even to
cleared counsel. 165 Since Judge Hogan's issuance of this order, the judges
assigned to oversee the resolution and merits of individual cases have begun
making independent decisions as to case management, adopting and
rejecting different parts of Hogan's order and making substantially different
66
rulings on exculpatory information and discovery.1

160. El Gharani v. Bush, No. 05-429, 2009 WL 88056, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009)
(citing "internal inconsistencies" in the witness accounts and granting petitioner's writ).
161. Id. at *3.
162. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 5245890 (D.D.C.
Dec. 16, 2008) (order amending procedures). This order is a significantly amended version
of an earlier order issued on November 6, 2008. Judge Hogan amended the order following
a motion to clarify and reconsider by the government. See id. (explaining the reasons for the
amendments).
163. See idat *1.
164. See id. at *2.
165. See id. ("If the government objects to providing the petitioner's counsel with the
classified information, the government shall move for an exception to disclosure.").
166. See, e.g., Al Ansi v. Bush, No. 08-1923, 2008 WL 5412373, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec 29,
2008) (order by Judge Gladys Kessler adopting some changes reflected in Judge Hogan's
amended order but otherwise reverting to the his original order); Hamlily v. Bush, No. 050763, at I (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2008) (order by Judge John D. Bates stating that further changes
to the consolidated case management order would have no bearing on cases before him).
There has also been substantial variation in the area of discovery, with some judges requiring
broader inquiry on behalf of the government and others limiting the government's obligation
to what is "reasonably available" or what has been reviewed in preparation of the factual
return or hearing. Compare Zemiri v. Obama, No. 05-2046 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2009) (defining
exculpatory information as evidence "that tends to materially undermine" evidence relied on
by the Government, and specifically "including evidence that undercuts the reliability and/or
credibility of the Government's evidence" and "that indicates a statement is unreliable
because it is the product of abuse, torture, or mental, or physical incapacity"), with AlGhizzawi v. Obama, No. 05-2378 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2008) (defining exculpatory evidence as
"all reasonably available evidence in its possession that tends materially to undermine the
information presented to support the government['s] justification for detaining the
petitioner"), and Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-1166 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2008) (requiring the
government to produce "any evidence contained in the material reviewed in developing the
return for the petitioner, and in preparation for the hearing for the petitioner, that tends
materially to undermine the Government's theory as to the lawfulness of the petitioner's
detention").
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On March 6, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit issued a ruling outlining and clarifying procedures to be
used in evaluating counsel access to classified information. 167 In addition
to providing badly needed direction in this otherwise murky area, the
decision provides great support to Part III of this Note, which advocates for
the adoption of CIPA in the habeas context. 168 The decision, Al Odah v.
Bush, reviewed a 2005 district court discovery order granting detainee
counsel access to classified information that had been redacted from even
the classified factual returns. 169 The government's timely appeal of the
order was held in abeyance pending Boumediene and resulted in this Court
of Appeals decision. 170 Al Odah's unique procedural posture makes it
directly applicable to only a small handful of cases, but, nonetheless, the
case "may give lawyers for Guantanamo Bay detainees expanded
opportunities to challenge the government's reasons for keeping them
confined."' 171 Indeed, the Court of Appeals clarified that, as in the criminal
context, the district court can order disclosure of classified information to
detainee counsel if the court "determine[s] that the information is both
relevant and material-in the sense that it is at least helpful to the
petitioner's habeas case." 172 Additionally, the court of appeals clarified that
the decision to order access to petitioner's counsel hinges on the court's
conclusion that such access "is necessary to facilitate meaningful review"
is
per the mandate of Boumediene. 173 The court of appeals found that "it 174
itself"
determination
materiality
the
make
to
responsibility
court's
the
but that, if a court determines that the presence of petitioner's counsel
would aid in making a decision about materiality, "nothing bars [the court]
(assuming no other privilege is at issue) from compelling the government to

167. Al Odah v. United States, 05-5117, 2009 WL 564310 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2009).
168. See infra Part III (arguing, in light of the three legal areas explored and the unique

issues involved in the Guantdnamo habeas cases, for the adoption of CIPA or a CIPA-like
statute in the habeas context).
169. Al Odah, 2009 WL 564310, at *3 (describing the district court's determination that
counsel with security clearance is entitled to see evidence that is related to the merits of the
case). The specific order was issued before Boumediene and before the issuance of Judge
Hogan's case management order, but both parties conceded that the new order would not
impact the finality of the appeal. Id. at *2.

170. Id. at*1.
171. Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/newlift-for-detainee-challenges (Mar. 9, 2009, 11:06 AM) (describing the ruling as "spell[ing]

out new rules on when the prisoners' lawyers get to see secret information in government
files"); cf id. ("It is unclear just how far the new ruling will go to cases that are now going
forward in District Court .

. .

. But, Friday's ruling does speak more generally about the

duties of the judge ... on resolving disputes over access to data withheld from detainees'
lawyers .... ").
172. Al Odah, 2009 WL 564310, at *4.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *5 (finding that a "naked declaration" by the government that the information
sought does not contain exculpatory information is insufficient basis for a court to determine
redacted statements are not material).
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produce an unclassified substitution that will enable counsel to assist the
court." 175

Using CIPA by "analogy," the court ruled that the alternatives to
disclosure available to the government under CIPA 176 should also be
available in the habeas context and that, though a finding of materiality is
required for the disclosure of classified information, it is "not a prerequisite
to ordering disclosure of an unclassified substitution."' 177 In the habeas
context, the court of appeals ruled, an alternative to disclosure is valid as
long as the alternatives "would suffice to provide the detainee with 'a
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to the
78
erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law.'"1
Though the habeas cases on Guantdnamo are unique, the problem of
classified information is not. Congress has provided legislation on the
procedures governing the use of classified information in judicial
proceedings including federal criminal proceedings, alien removal
proceedings where an alien is believed to be a national security threat, and,
most recently, the MCA. 179 This legislation and case law is reviewed
below, assessing the successes and challenges of balancing individual rights
and the protection of national security information in each context.
II. FINDING

A BALANCE: JUDICIALLY AND CONGRESSIONALLY ENDORSED

SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLENGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Part II.A of this Note focuses on the use of classified evidence in federal
criminal trials. CIPA guides federal courts in all criminal cases where such
evidence is relied upon by either side. Part II.B of this Note turns to the use
of classified evidence in the immigration context. The use of classified
information in immigration cases is controlled by a combination of statute,
federal regulation, and case law, depending on the specific legal issue
involved. Finally, Part II.C of this Note focuses on the use of classified
evidence in the military commissions at Guantdinamo Bay. Each section
within Part II begins by providing background about the regulations and
policies that exist in each context, provides a description of the procedures
that govern access to the particular information, and concludes with a
critique of the policies and regulations in each context.

175. Id. at *7.
176. See infra Part II.B (outlining the various alternatives to disclosure under CIPA,
including summaries or substitutions).
177. Al Odah, 2009 WL 564310, at *7.
178. Id. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266 (2008)).
179. See infra Part II.C (providing details on the Military Commissions Act).
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A. CIPA and FederalCriminalCourts
1. The History of CIPA
Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of CIPA as a procedural
mechanism depends first upon understanding the original purpose of the
Act. CIPA governs the use of classified evidence in federal criminal trials
and was enacted in the 1980s to bring cold war espionage suspects to
trial.18 0 CIPA was intended to allow the government to evaluate individual
cases and "'make an informed decision in determining whether or not the
benefits of prosecution . . . outweigh the harm stemming from public

disclosure of such [classified] information." 181 Rather than creating new
discovery or evidentiary standards, CIPA was intended to "'clarify' a
court's existing 'powers under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(d)(1)' to protect classified information."' 182 Congress intended CIPA to
be a flexible procedure that provided structure and standards for the use of
classified evidence without "ossify[ing]" courts and judges with overly
restrictive procedure. 183 More recently, CIPA has been used successfully to
prosecute and convict terrorists as well as those charged with material
support for terrorism or other related crimes.1 84 Though terrorism cases
185
often present very different challenges than traditional espionage trials,
and often lead to the inability of defendants to view the evidence against

180. Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. III
(2006)). Richard Zabel and James Benjamin provide a comprehensive description of the
purposes of CIPA, both as originally envisioned and in more contemporary situations. See
RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:

PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES INTHE FEDERAL COURTS 82 (2008). The original purpose of

CIPA was to combat "graymailing" by a defendant charged with a national-security-related
crime but who has access to classified documents and threatens to release these documents
as part of his defense. Id.; see also Timothy J. Shea, CIPA Under Siege: The Use and Abuse
of Classified Information in Criminal Trials, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 657, 662 (1990);
Tamanaha, supra note 112, at 277-303 (providing a comprehensive legislative history and
review of CIPA).
181. Shea, supra note 180, at 662 & n.23 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. 26,503 (1980)
(statement of Rep. Romano Mazzoli, House floor manager of the bill)).
182. United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting S. REP. No. 96823, at 6 (1980)) (conducting relevance review of classified evidence under CIPA); see also
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
183. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 180, at 85 (noting congressional interest in judicial
creativity to reach fair solutions in cases involving classified evidence).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (using CIPA in a
federal criminal case); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 749 (N.D. I11.2006)
(upholding the constitutionality of CIPA in a material support of terrorism case involving
Hamas); United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Bin
Laden, No. 98-1023 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2001); see also ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 180,
at 26-27 (presenting sentencing data from terrorism prosecutions in criminal court); id. at
31-60 (listing existing criminal statutes that can be used to prosecute terrorists and collecting
cases that exemplify the successful application of these statutes).
185. See supra note 180.
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186
defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
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protecting

2. CIPA-Mandated Procedures
Having provided a brief historical context, Part II.A.2 explains the
procedural mandates of CIPA. To begin, either party may move for a
pretrial conference to "consider matters relating to classified information"
that could come up during the case. 187 The court can also move for such a
conference sua sponte. 188 During this conference, the government may
make a motion for a protective order. 189 Where a protective order has been
entered and the defense counsel obtains a security clearance, he can share
classified information with a defendant only by "showing that the
defendant's personal input is necessary in order to evaluate a particular item
' 190
of information adequately."
When a defendant intends to introduce classified information pretrial or
during trial, he must provide thirty days' notice and a brief description of
the information. 19 1 If the defendant later learns of additional classified
information he seeks to use, he must alert the government as soon as
possible. 192 The government is then given reasonable time to seek a
hearing to determine the use, relevance, or admissibility of the
information. 193 If the Attorney General certifies that a public proceeding
would result in disclosure of national security information, this hearing
"shall be held in camera." 194 Where the government intends to hold such a
hearing, the government must give notice to the defendant and, if the

186. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, No.01-455-A, 2002 WL 1987964, at *1 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 23, 2002) ("We further conclude that [his] Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are

adequately protected by standby counsel's review of the classified discovery and their
participation in any proceedings held pursuant to [CIPA], even though the defendant will be
excluded from these proceedings."); United States v. Bin Laden, No. 98-1023, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 719 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2001) (assessing numerous constitutional challenges to
CIPA and upholding the validity of the Act).
187. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. III § 2 (2006).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. TURNER & SCHULHOFER, supra note 112, at 28. At the time of writing, Serrin Turner
and Stephen Schulhofer had not identified a single case in which defense counsel had
successfully demonstrated a need to show classified evidence to which they had access to the
defendant. Id.
191. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 5 (specifying that the defendant must give notice on his
intention to use classified information within thirty days unless another time is specified by
the court).
192. Id. (requiring that defendants also include a brief description of the classified
information).
193. Id. (giving the government reasonable time to seek a determination pursuant to CIPA
§ 6); id. § 6 (providing that the government may request a hearing for determinations of
relevance, use, or admissibility determinations).
194. Id. § 6(a).
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defendant already has access to 95the information, specify the exact
information that it seeks to exclude.1
Where classified information is implicated in discovery, CIPA was not
intended to change the government's discovery obligations under the rules
of evidence. 196 CIPA "contemplates an application of the general law of
discovery ...with limitations imposed based on the sensitive nature of the
classified information."' 197 Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure remains the relevant governing law and entitles a defendant to
"'any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant."" 198
In practice, however, courts have imposed the "limitations" contemplated
by CIPA by applying a heightened standard of relevance and some have
also conducted a balancing test.1 99
Where the government seeks to deny disclosure of a document because
of its classified nature, courts first assess whether or not the document
sought is relevant and whether or not it is "material," or "helpful to the
defense of an accused. '200 Some courts have also queried whether access
20 1
to the information is "'essential to a fair determination of a cause."'
Courts employing a balancing test then go on to weigh the potential
national security risks attending disclosure against the defendant's need to
access the documents. 20 2 Whether or not information is ultimately
disclosed depends upon "the 'particular circumstances of each case, taking

195. Id. § 6(b)(1) (clarifying that when the defendant has not previously had access to the
information, "the information may be described by generic category" in a form approved by
the court).
196. See United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (endorsing
defendant's argument that CIPA is a procedural statute that does not create a privilege
against discovery of classified information); United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d
1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Congress intended CIPA to clarify the court's power to restrict
discovery of classified information." (citing United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965
(9th Cir. 1988))); United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[CIPA]
creates no new rights of or limits on discovery of a specific area of classified information.").
197. Yunis, 867 F.2d at 621.
198. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)).

199. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 211 n.32 ("[C]ircuit courts differ as to whether a
balancing test is applicable.".); see, e.g., Yunis, 867 F.2d at 625 (neither adopting nor
rejecting a balancing test); Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965 (adopting a balancing test); United
States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1110 (4th Cir. 1985) (same).
200. Shea, supra note 180, at 692; see also Yunis, 867 F.2d at 622 (explaining that the
requirement that information sought be "helpful to the accused" is derived from the
informant's privilege "which permits the government to withhold disclosure of an
informant's identity or the contents of the communication which would endanger the secrecy
of that information" (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957))).
201. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1107-10 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61) (applying the
Roviaro standard to a case where a defendant sought access to classified information).
202. See Yunis, 867 F.2d at 625 (describing the balancing test as weighing the defendant's
interest in disclosure against the government's need to keep the information secret);
BENJAMIN & ZABEL, supra note 180, at 82 (describing the balancing test as "balanc[ing]
relevance with national security interests to decide whether information is discoverable"
(citing Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623)).
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into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible
' 20 3
significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors."'
Even when a court determines that a document must be available to a
defendant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the government
may not have to turn over the document. For example, even where
defendants show relevance, inculpatory or otherwise significant information
that the government does not intend to rely upon need not be turned over to
defense. 20 4 Additionally, section four of CIPA authorizes the government
to produce various substitutes for the classified evidence "upon a sufficient
showing." 20 5 This showing may be made ex parte. 20 6 If ex parte, the entire
request must be sealed and preserved in the records of the court in case of
207
appeal.
Valid substitutes under CIPA include redacted versions of the
documents, a summary of the information included in the documents, or a
substitute statement that admits "relevant facts that the classified
information would tend to prove." 20 8 Substitutions must be fair to the
defendant and provide him with "substantially the same ability to make his
defense" as he would have through actual access to the documents. 20 9 In
applying this standard, "courts have generally allowed substitutions so long
as they do not "omit information directly relevant to the defense. ' 2 10 If the
court denies a proposed substitution, the Attorney General may submit a
formal objection to the disclosure of the information. 2 11 This standard is
203. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1107 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62).
204. See United States v. Rahman, 870 F. Supp. 47, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[I]nculpatory
[classified discovery] material which the government does not intend to offer at trial need
not be disclosed. Such information cannot conceivably help a defendant, and therefore is
both unnecessary and useless to him.").
205. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. III § 4 (2006); see also
United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2006) ("Section four only applies
after the threshold question of materiality is made in favor of disclosure or the government
agrees to disclosure without making a materiality challenge.").
206. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 4 (allowing for the submission of a "written statement to be
inspected by the court alone"); see also United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 457 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (finding that section 4 of CIPA does not require defense counsel participation and
should only be used for discovery determinations); United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144
F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that an ex parte, in camera hearing with a
government lawyer was an appropriate proceeding by which to determine relevancy under
section 4 of CIPA); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st Cir. 1984) (upholding ex
parte, in camera review of documents to review for national security implications because
sections three and four of CIPA were intended to limit discovery of classified documents).
207. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 4 (providing for the preservations of ex parte, section 4 requests
to be made available to the appellate court in case of an appeal).
208. Id.
209. Id. § 6(c)(1); see also TURNER & SCHULHOFER, supra note 112, at 20 (calling this a
"critical" safeguard and noting the need for "[c]areful judicial scrutiny" to maintain this
standard and prevent government abuse of the ability to substitute).
210. TURNER & SCHULHOFER, supra note 112, at 21 (citing United States v. Smith, 780
F.2d 1102, 1110 (4th Cir. 1985)); see United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir.
1989); United States v. Collins, 603 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
211. See 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(e) (allowing the Attorney General to submit an affidavit
objecting to disclosure of specific information the defendant seeks to use at trial).
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officially articulated in section six of CIPA as applying to trials, but courts
have assumed that Congress intended the same standard to apply to
substitutions approved for discovery. 2 12 In the event of an adverse ruling
on the discovery or admissibility of any classified information, either side
2 13
may bring an immediate, interlocutory appeal.
Typically, after making a relevance determination, a judge will determine
the adequacy of a proposed substitution ex parte. 2 14 In the case of United
States v. Moussaoui,2 15 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
clarified that CIPA also authorized a more collaborative approach to
determining the adequacy of a substitution. While noting that CIPA allows
the government to move for an order allowing substitutions of classified
evidence ex parte, the court found that "nothing in CIPA expressly or
implicitly precludes the involvement of defense counsel or the district
2 16
court" in assessing the adequacy of a substitution.
Harnessing the flexibility of CIPA, courts have recently held the
substitution provisions of CIPA to apply to a defendant's access to
witnesses, in addition to documents. 2 17 For example, in the Moussaoui
case, defense counsel sought access to witnesses held at Guantdtnamo Bay,
but the government insisted that such access would interfere with national
security. 2 18 The Fourth Circuit developed a plan whereby, in lieu of direct
examination, the government would provide redacted summaries of secret
evidence containing the information defense counsel sought to obtain from
protected witnesses. 2 19 As envisioned by the Fourth Circuit, the defense
212. See TURNER & SCHULHOFER, supra note 112, at 21 (noting that though the

substitution methods available to the Government are the same, requests for substitutions at
trial, unlike those made during discovery, cannot be made ex parte).
213. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 7(b) ("An appeal taken pursuant to this section either before or
during trial shall be expedited by the court of appeals."); see also TURNER & SCHULHOFER,

supra note 112, at 23 (describing section 7 as "entitling either party to an immediate appeal
from adverse rulings regarding classified information").
214. See BENJAMIN & ZABEL, supra note 180, at 88 (describing the resulting exclusion of
the defense attorney as an aspect of CIPA often attacked by critics but noting that it is no
different from discovery and exculpatory determinations in criminal proceedings).
215. 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004) (evaluating alleged terrorist's right to access classified
information).
216. Id. at 480 n.36.
217. See, e.g., Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 471 n.20 (using CIPA as "a useful framework" in a
criminal terrorism prosecution where the defendant sought to depose witnesses of high
intelligence value held at Guantdnamo Bay); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708,
745-46 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir.
1998)) (explaining that CIPA applies to testimony and documents, and therefore interpreting
section 4 to allow the hearing of testimony ex parte and in camera). CIPA itself also makes
provisions for taking testimony midtrial. See 18 U.S.C. app. III § 8(c) ("During the
examination of a witness ... the [Government] may object to any question or line of inquiry
that may require the witness to disclose classified information not previously found to be
admissible.").
218. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 471 n.20.
219. Id. at 479 (holding that redacted summaries of redacted intelligence reports are an
"adequate basis for the creation of written statements that may be submitted to the jury in
lieu of the witnesses' deposition testimony" where the district court previously found the
summaries to accurately reflect the contents of the intelligence reports).
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could select relevant sections from these summaries, the government would
then review these submissions to determine that they were not misleading,
and only then would the court "make rulings as necessary" of the
220
admissibility of the proposed evidence.
Where evidence is found necessary for use at trial and cannot be
adequately substituted or, for national security reasons, be shown to the
defendant, courts can sanction the government. 2 2 1 Available sanctions
include a dismissal of the indictment, a dismissal of the counts to which the
excluded information relates, a finding against the prosecution on any issue
to which the excluded information relates, or striking all or part of the
222
testimony of a witness.
If the only practicable sanction is dismissal, or the charge itself would
require revealing classified information, the government may try to create
an "alternate charge. '223 In other words, the government may bring a
charge for which they do not need to rely on classified evidence. 224 In
situations where the government cannot bring sufficiently serious charges
without disclosing classified information, it can also seek delay until either
other evidence is developed or the sensitivity of the information has
2 25
diminished, or dismiss the case.
Importantly, CIPA does not allow a jury to see any information that the
defendant himself cannot see. 226 Though there have been some espionage
cases where a jury has been given evidence denied to the defendant, these
cases all involved defendants who had already had the opportunity to see
the classified documents at issue. 22 7 In contrast, typical terrorism cases are
brought against petitioners who have never had access to classified

220. Id. at 480 n.35 (allowing government review of the statement selected for admission
by the defense for the purposes of cross-designating other portions that might be required
under the rule of completeness).
221. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(e)(2) (listing sanctions).
222. Id. § 6 (e)(2)(A)-(C).
223. TURNER & SCHULHOFER, supra note 112, at 35 (describing that where a charge
requires disclosure of classified information and "the suspect truly is a terrorist" the
government should be able to find evidence of illegal activity of another kind, permitting
legal action without implicating classified information).
224. See id. (citing the use of the material support statute in the case of the Lackawanna
Six, suspected Al Qaeda trainees arrested without evidence of a specific attack plan, as an
example of successfully prosecuting under an alternative charge).
225. See id. at 33 (citing United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 164 (4th Cir. 1990),
as the only case to be dismissed as part of a sanction because, without access to classified
evidence, any defense would be "eviscerated").
226. See id. at 20 ("If an unclassified substitution is approved for use at trial in lieu of
certain classified information, the jury sees only the substitution; it does not see the
underlying classified information.").
227. See id. at 91 n.101 (citing United States v. Zettle, 835 F.2d 1059, 1063 (4th Cir.
1987)) (describing that in cases where the jurors, but not the defendant, had access to
classified material during the trial, the defendant has always had prior access to documents
and been familiar with their contents).
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material. 228 Still, while courts have used protective orders to exclude
defendants from pretrial discovery, as discussed above, the courts have
never excluded a defendant from trial during the introduction of classified
229
evidence.
3. Criticisms of CIPA
Despite the widespread and successful use of CIPA in criminal trials,
CIPA is hardly immune from criticism. One common criticism of CIPA is
that it excludes security-cleared defense counsel from the decision-making
process about disclosure. 230 A related complaint is that defense counsel
must show the relevance of classified information before it is made
available to them and thus "they cannot show [its] helpfulness."'23 1 In
addition, even where defense counsel is allowed to access information, the
defendant is not, and discussion between attorney and client is hindered.
Classified evidence is often key, and defense counsel's ability to fact-find
and investigate is severely crippled. 232 Critics thus argue that CIPA has "in
essence . . . created a rebuttable presumption that classified discovery
materials may be adequately reviewed by defense counsel alone" and that a
233
defendant's input is not required.
The imbalance of information between attorney and client also curtails
defense counsel's ability to cross-examine witnesses and to access all of the
evidence against a client. 234 In addition, this presents challenges in
preparing a defendant to testify. This not only puts a defendant "at a
significant disadvantage" but also "call[s] into question" the "fundamental
ethical mandates for counsel. '235 As one frustrated defense attorney
questioned, "How do you prepare your client to testify when you have
fifteen months of wiretaps related to your client that are off limits to

228. See generally United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (using
CIPA to prosecute charges of conspiracy and material support of Hamas where defendant
had no connection to the United States that would allow access to classified information).
229. TURNER & SCHULHOFER, supra note 112, at 32 (noting that no cases were found
where exclusion of the defendant from trial was even considered).
. 230. Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 213-14 (noting that, though the court is in a "more
neutral" position, neither the court nor the government "by role" share the defense
perspective on what is material or relevant).
231. United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (determining, ultimately,
that this "apparent Catch-22 is more apparent than real").
232. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 216 ("'So how do you know what is relevant
and what is not relevant? How do you know what is good to introduce into evidence and
what is bad to introduce into evidence?"' (quoting Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in
Defending a Terrorism Case: Stuck in the Middle, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J.

65, 69 (2003))).
233. TURNER& SCHULHOFER, supra note 112, at 28.
234. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 216 ("[C]ounsel often cannot conduct an
adequate investigation and prepare a defense.").
235. Id. at 208.
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him?" 236 A further result of this inhibited communication is the
237
undermining of trust between attorney and client.
Another concern is that the government's use of section 4 ex parte
procedures designed for discovery determinations "threatens to swallow"
the protections offered by section 6.238 This is a risk where classified
information is raised by the government midtrial, in an ex parte submission
to the judge under section 4, rather than pretrial under section 6. Absent
certification from the Attorney General, section 6 contemplates the presence
of defense counsel and thus offers greater protections to defendants' rights
than the section 4 procedure. 239 As noted by Ellen C. Yaroshefsky,
professor of Ethics and Criminal Law at Cardozo School of Law, the case
of United States v. Mejia240 is a good example. 24 1 In Mejia, the U.S.
Department of Justice obtained an ex parte order midtrial to prevent
disclosure of classified information without notice to the prosecutor or the
defendant. 242 The D.C. Circuit found that, though the defense may be
disadvantaged by such a procedure, there was "no support for the
defendant's claim of the right to participation or access in CIPA or the
Federal Rules." 243 Some, like Professor
Yaroshefsky, view this as a
244
deliberate abuse of CIPA procedures.
Another critique of CIPA, which was the subject of litigation in United
States v. Osama Bin Laden,245 is that CIPA requires defense counsel to
undergo thorough and lengthy clearance procedures. 246 The process
requires disclosure of intimate and personal information, including past
history of mental health counseling. 247 In addition, defense counsel in Bin

236. Dratel, supra note 232, at 69.
237. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (discussing ethical strains on
attorney-client relationship caused by unequal access to information); see also NACDL

Brief, supra note 125, at 10 ("Without access to all material information, a defendant cannot
consult adequately with counsel to assist in the determination of what portions of the
classified discovery are relevant and exculpatory, or which might lead to such evidence.");
Mark Denbeaux & Christa Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-Client Relationship in Guantanamo
Bay, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 491, 493 (2007) (describing the attorney-client relationship at
Guantdnamo as "overwhelmed" by paternalism because of the protective order and other
external influences).
238. See Tamanaha, supra note 112, at 308 (describing the effect of improperly invoking
section 4 midtrial).
239. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6 (2006).
240. 448 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
241. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 215-16 & n.53 (citing Mejia as an example of
the government using section 4 midtrial to avoid the presence of defense counsel).
242. Mejia, 448 F.3d at 458.
243. Id.
244. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 217; see also Tamanaha, supra note 112, at 303.
245. 58 F. Supp. 2d 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
246. Id. at 115 (seeking confirmation of the constitutionality of requiring defense
attorneys to obtain security clearance).
247. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., STANDARD FoRM 86, QUESTIONNAIRE FOR
NATIONAL
SECURITY
POSITIONS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.opm.gov[Forms/pdf fill/sf86.pdf; see also Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 115-16

(describing the invasive qualities of the clearance process).
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Laden alleged that the clearance process gives the government effective
"veto power" over defendant's choice of counsel. 248 In spite of these
criticisms, the clearance process was upheld as within the court's authority,
constitutional, 9and desirable in cases involving sensitive national security
24
information.
Alternatively, many, like former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey,
argue that CIPA fails to adequately protect against the dissemination of
national security information. For example, Mukasey claims that terrorists
have been made aware of ongoing searches for specific individuals,
including Osama Bin Laden, as a result of disclosures made pursuant to
CIPA. 250 Mukasey has also claimed that the testimony made public as the
result of CIPA alerted terrorists to the government's surveillance, and, as a
result, "[their] communication network shut down within days and
intelligence was lost to the government forever, intelligence that might have
prevented who knows what."'25 1 A final, and related, criticism from this
perspective is that Article III courts, even with the protections added by
CIPA, are not "well-positioned to address fully our national security and
intelligence interests." 252 Mukasey points to a perceived overcrowding of
dockets, the use of traditional rules of evidence, and
features that emphasize
253
the rights of the individual over the government.
B. ClassifiedEvidence in the Immigration Context
Part II.A of this Note focused on the procedural adaptations developed
under and mandated by CIPA. Part II.B discusses similar adaptations that
have developed throughout immigration law, taking note of the innate
differences between the two areas of the law.
1. The History and Use of Classified Information in Immigration
Proceedings
Immigration law is relevant to the Guantdinamo cases both because the
petitioners are uniformly noncitizens and because of the long history of
habeas corpus in immigrations proceedings. 2 54 This is particularly true
248. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
249. Id. at 122-23.
250. See Paul Taylor, The Historical and Legal Norms Governing the Detention of
Suspected Terrorists and the Risks Posed by Recent Efforts to Departfrom Them, 12 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 223, 255 (2008) (citing Taylor, supra note 139). But see ZABEL & BENJAMIN,
supra note 180, at 88 (suggesting that the government made no effort to invoke CIPA with
respect to information at issue in the case discussed by Michael Mukasey and reporting that,
based on a search of public records, no "important" security breach has been reported as
resulting from CIPA).
251. Taylor, supra note 139, at 16.
252. Mukasey, supra note 6.
253. Id.
254. See Hafetz, supra note 33, at 2514 ("[H]abeas corpus has always been available to
aliens to test the legality of [deportation orders] before an Article III court." (citing Heikkila
v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953)). But see Stephen J. Townley, Note, The Use and Misuse of
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given the extent to which immigration law has clarified that one's
procedural due process rights depend upon citizenship status and physical
location, either at the border or within the country. 255 In general, aliens
within the country, whether legally present or not, are granted higher levels
2 56
of due process than those outside of the country.
A broad view of the government organizations that manage immigration
law is helpful here. In 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) divided immigration policy and enforcement of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) among three agencies, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). 257 Like all agency decisions, those
of ICE, USCIS, and CBP are subject to varying degrees of judicial
258
review.
Throughout the 1990s, approximately twenty-five immigration cases
involved the use of classified information. 259 Prior to September 11, 2001,
lawmakers began to work on codifying regulations that would control the
use of classified evidence in immigration cases. 260 After the attacks of
September 11, efforts to pass this type of corrective legislation waned, and
the immigration system became "'an incredibly important piece of the
terrorism response."' 26 1 Between March 2003, when ICE was founded, and

Secret Evidence in Immigration Cases: A Comparative Study of the United States, Canada,
and the United Kingdom, 32 YALE J.INT'L L. 219, 230, n.93 (2007) (citing INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001)) (noting that, though all noncitizens have a right to file habeas,
there is some question as to whether noncitizens will have the right to review issues of fact).
255. "The differing levels of procedural due process applicable to non-citizens at the
border and those within the country... derive from the constitutional jurisprudence and
therefore probably still constrain how the government can treat both non-citizens at the
border and those found within the country." Ramji-Nogales, supra note 140, at 298 (citing
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)).
256. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694 (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982)).
257. 6 U.S.C. §§ 251-298 (2006) (ordering the transfer of programs from the
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization to the Under Secretary of Border and
Transportation Security and other divisions of Homeland Security).
258. See generally Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) (applying the principle of judicial
review to agency action in the case of an individual seeking review of a citizenship
determination made outside of the United States).
259. Robert M. Chesney, Panel Report: Beyond Article III Courts: Military Tribunals,
Status Review Tribunals, and Immigration Courts, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J.
27, 31 (2006) (highlighting Professor David Cole's remark that "approximately twenty-five
cases in the 1990s involving immigration law proceedings used secret evidence, or ex parte,
in camera evidence").
260. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 140, at 304 (describing efforts to pass the Secret
Evidence Repeal Act which would have allowed removal of classified immigration cases to
federal court and the application of CIPA).
261. Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-terrorism Tool: Use of Charges to
Detain or Deport Suspects Criticized by Muslim Groups, WASH. POST, June 13, 2005, at Al
(quoting Michael J. Garcia, head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement). Initially,
former President George W. Bush supported the Secret Evidence Repeal Act but it failed to
pass six months before 9/11 and, following the attacks, was never reintroduced. RamjiNogales, supra note 140, at 304-05.
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June 2005, more than 500 people were charged with immigration violations
262
that began with national-security-based investigations.
2. Article I Courts: Expedited Removal and Discretionary Relief
The Constitution's protections are the lowest for aliens whom the
government seeks to exclude before they have even entered. 26 3 In this
context, Congress has authorized the use of ex parte, in camera evidentiary
264
procedures for the expedited removal of an inadmissible arriving alien.
If an immigration official is "satisfied on the basis of confidential
information" that the alien is inadmissible for national security reasons, he
265
may order the alien removed pending review by the Attorney General.
Findings that the alien seeks entry for purposes of participating in
espionage, sabotage, overthrow of the government, terrorist activity, or,
more generally, because his admission would have "potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States" 266 are all
considered valid bases for inadmissibility. 267 Aliens may submit a
statement for the Attorney General's review, but excludability can be based
268
solely on confidential documents.
The use of classified evidence for the exclusion of nonresident aliens
seeking entry "generally stands on firm constitutional ground. '269 In the
262. Sheridan, supra note 261.
263. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (noting that the "entry" distinction
runs throughout immigration law, such that "certain constitutional protections available to
persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic
borders"); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) ("Mere lawful presence in the
country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights; [these
rights] become more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of
intention to become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon
naturalization.").
264. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2006) (providing regulations governing the expedited
removal of aliens inadmissible on security and related grounds). Stephen Townley points
out that this provision probably applies equally to aliens already within the country but who
entered without inspection because the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 "effaced any distinction between those within the United States
illegally and those seeking admission at the border." Townley, supra note 254, at 229 n.82
(citing 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(13)(A)). Two federal courts have also supported the use of
classified information to deny unadmitted aliens asylum hearings. See Azzouka v. Meese,
820 F.2d 585, 587 (2d Cir. 1987); Avila v. Rivkind, 724 F. Supp. 945, 950 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
265. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (allowing removal without further review if the
Attorney General has consulted with the appropriate security agencies and believes the alien
is inadmissible for national security reasons).
266. Id. § II 82(a)(3)(c)(i) (2006).
267. Id. § 1225(c)(2)(B)(i) (listing bases of inadmissibility).
268. Id. § 1225(c)(3) (allowing the alien or his representative to submit additional
documents for the consideration of the Attorney General); see also Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (finding valid exclusion based on confidential
documents the disclosure of which would prejudice public interest).
269. Matthew R. Hall, ProceduralDue Process Meets NationalSecurity: The Problem of
Classified Evidence in Immigration Proceedings, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 515, 518 (2002)
(citing Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213-14; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 544 (1950)).
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case of expedited removal, the statute governing procedures does not
establish hearings, create evidentiary procedures, provide notice of
allegations to the alien, or demand that government officials reach a
standard of proof.270

This distinct lack of process explains why the

27 1
procedure has been called "summary exclusion."
For permanent residents who have resided in the United States, including
those who have gained entry unlawfully, the law is less clear. 272 In
Rafeedie v. INS,273 the D.C. District Court found that a lawful permanent
resident returning to the country after a short trip was denied a
constitutional right to due process when the court allowed the use of ex
parte, classified evidence. 274 The court followed Mathews v. Eldrige to
weigh the alien's interest in the fair resolution of the proceeding and the
risk of error involved in the hearing against the government's interest in
using classified evidence. 275 The court found that "even a manifest national
basis on
security interest of the United States" would not be an appropriate
276
which to deny due process to a permanent resident alien.
Classified information is also used as evidence by immigration judges
considering an alien's application for discretionary relief. Discretionary
relief includes requests for asylum, adjustment of status, or 277a
redetermination of bail pending the outcome of a deportation proceeding.
Most forms of discretionary relief are based on the "unfettered discretion"
of the Attorney General, rather than a petitioner's right to relief.2 78 In such

270. See id. at 517-18 (discussing the lack of process afforded aliens in expedited
removal hearings).
271. See Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 515-16 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing the process
mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1225 as "the minimum statutory summary proceeding").
272. See Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 519 (ordering an injunction to bar summary proceedings
found to unconstitutionally deny the petitioning permanent resident alien the opportunity to
confront classified evidence); see also Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 ("[A]liens who have once
passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming
to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law." (citations omitted)).
273. 880 F.2d 506.
274. Id. at 525 (remanding to the district court for entry of partial summary judgment for
petitioner and further proceedings on whether the combination of the procedural protections
that have been afforded Yacoub Rafeedie thus far and the limited protections further
required by § 1225(c) satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process).
275. See id. at 524-25 (laying out the interests at stake in a Mathews balancing test).
276. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 523. But see infra Part II.C (discussing the Alien Terrorist
Removal Court (ATRC), which allows secret evidence for the removal of a permanent
resident with other procedural protections); Townley, supra note 254, at 227 (interpreting the
ATRC to allow secret evidence for removal of an alien but not for denial of re-entry).
277. See, e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (denial of application for discretionary
suspension of deportation based on secret evidence); United States ex rel. Barbour v. INS,
491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[R]elease on bail is a form of discretionary relief .... ).
278. See Jay, 351 U.S. at 357-58. Significantly, the holding of Jay v. Boyd dealt only
with a statutory challenge to the use of secret evidence in the discretion context and not a
constitutional challenge. See Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999, Part I: Hearing on H.R.
2121 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 41-43 (2000) (statement of David
Cole, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter David Cole Testimony].
David Cole also points out that the cases usually relied on by the government to prove there
is no constitutional deprivation where secret evidence is used to deny a suspension of
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cases, the government is never required to submit a substitute for the
classified information it wishes to proffer, and Congress explicitly denies an
alien the right to view national security information proffered by the
government in opposition to the alien's motion for discretionary relief from
removal. 279 In cases where an alien has applied for asylum or withholding
of removal, the government can use classified information, and the alien is
given an unclassified version only if such a summary is "consistent[] with
safeguarding both the classified nature of the information and its
sources." 280 If a summary is provided, it "should be as detailed as possible"
28 1
so that the alien will have an opportunity to challenge the evidence.
Where a summary or substitute cannot be provided consistent with
national security, the Supreme Court has held that no substitution is
required. 282 If evidence indicates that the alien has engaged in terrorism or
poses a threat to national security, the alien seeking relief from removal
must refute this evidence by a preponderance of the evidence. 283 Thus, an
alien has the burden of proving that discretionary action is warranted, often
without seeing the evidence against him.
Bail redetermination, another kind of discretionary review,2 84 presents
unique issues for permanent residents. Two federal cases have held that
lawful aliens who had overstayed their visas were denied their
constitutional right to due process and a fundamentally fair hearing when
they were denied access to classified information during bail
redeterminations.2 8 5 "[A]liens, once legally admitted into the United States,

' 286
In Al Najjar v. Reno, 287
are entitled to the shelter of the Constitution."

deportation erroneously rely on Jay v. Boyd for a constitutional finding. Id.; see also Suciu v.
INS, 755 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1985).
279. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2006).
280. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3)(iv) (2007) (describing procedures for applications of
asylum and withholding of removal).
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., Jay, 351 U.S. 345 (finding that where a resident alien has already been
found deportable and is seeking discretionary relief, confidential information can be used to
deny discretionary relief if disclosure of the information would be prejudicial to the public
safety).
283. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d); see Hall, supra note 269, at 520; see also United States ex reL
Barbour v. INS, 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir. 1974) (describing alien as bearing "a heavy
burden" to show that the Attorney General abused his discretion).
284. See Barbour, 491 F.2d at 578 (defining release on bail as a form of discretionary
relief).
285. See Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that
where alien has overstayed student visa and concedes deportability but seeks discretionary
relief, he is denied procedural due process when the evidence for his removability is based
on classified information unseen by the alien and his counsel); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F.
Supp. 2d 402, 404 (D.N.J. 1999) (finding that a bond determination based on uncorroborated
hearsay and secret evidence that petitioner, a student who had overstayed his visa, cannot
examine or confront is a violation of petitioner's procedural due process right).
286. Kiareldeen, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 409 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 31 (1982)) (denying the government's argument
that because petitioner conceded that he overstayed his visa, he had "forfeited" his due
process rights).
287. 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329.
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the government even provided the alien with notice of intent to rely on
classified information in camera, a summary of the classified information,
and an opportunity to rebut the unclassified return. 288 Reasoning that a
deportable alien who is legally or illegally present is entitled to more due
process than an excludable alien at the border but less due process than a
permanent resident, 2 89 the district court held that the use of classified
hearing "implicates core interests of
information in a bond redetermination
290
the Due Process Clause."
As stated above, a judge adjudicating an application for permanent
resident status may inform the alien of the nature of the evidence against
him only if this can be done while safeguarding the source of the
292
evidence. 29' In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno,
however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted the use
of secret evidence in hearings following applications by two men for
adjustment of status. 293 Both aliens were accused of being members of a
terrorist organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and
of overstaying their visas. 294 Both subsequently applied for legalization
and a change of status and were given notice of the government's intent to
deny their application based on classified information. 295 The men filed
suit in district court, challenging the use of undisclosed classified
information on several grounds, including a due process violation. 296 The
district court conducted an ex parte, in camera review of the government's
evidence and granted a permanent injunction against the government,
preventing the use of297undisclosed classified evidence against these men
based on due process.
Applying the Mathews v. Eldrige test, the court found that the aliens,
who had lived in the United States for ten years and would be deported if
their request for a change of status were denied, had a strong interest in
288. Id. at 1333-34 (describing steps taken after petitioner was taken into custody).
289. Id. at 1344 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 972 (1 1th Cir. 1984) ("[T]hose with
the status of deportable aliens are constitutionally entitled to rights in the deportation context
that are inapplicable to exclusion proceedings."), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)).
290. Id. at 1353-54 (citations omitted) (listing due process rights implicated: (1) the right
to petition the Government and have petition judged fairly, at a meaningful time and manner;
(2) notice of the grounds on which the Government seeks detention; and (3) an opportunity
to present evidence in opposition to the Government).
291. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1 l(a)(3) (2007); see also supra note 280 and accompanying text.
292. 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999)
(affirming the district court's grant of a permanent injunction preventing the use of
undisclosed classified information against two petitioners in legalization proceedings).
293. Id. at 1052.
294. Id. at 1052-53 (describing charges under the McCarren-Walters Act of 1952 for
membership in an organization that allegedly advocates "world communism" (citing 8
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6)(D), (F)-(H) (1988))).
295. Id. at 1054 (the government's intent to deny was based on excludability under a
former section of U.S. Code involving a threat to national security).
296. Id. (describing the district court's finding of jurisdiction and the issuance of a
preliminary injunction).
297. Id. (describing the district court's finding that the use of confidential, classified
information submitted by the government would constitute a due process violation).
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changing their status to avoid deportation. 298 Additionally, the court found
that the risk of reaching an erroneous decision based on classified
information was high: "One would be hard pressed to design a procedure
more likely to result in erroneous deprivations. '299 Finally, the court found
that the government's interest in removal based on classified information
was weak because there was no evidence showing that the aliens in
question were a threat to the country. 30 0 Perhaps most significantly, the
court recognized that, though not all rights afforded to criminal defendants
translate to the civil context, procedural due process and hearings have
"ancient roots" in the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. 30 1
3. Immigration Review in Article III Courts: The Alien Terrorist
Removal Court
In Part II.B.2 above, this Note explored the use of classified information
in administrative hearings. The Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC)
system, however, is a statutorily enacted court system designed to work
with classified information in immigration cases in Article III courts. 30 2
The ATRC was enacted in 1996303 in response to the Oklahoma City
Bombing. 30 4 Despite its adoption by Congress, it has not yet been used. 30 5
In theory, the ATRC could be used to remove residents currently within the
country and also permanent residents entering at a border where the
306
government has secret evidence against them.

298. Id. at 1068-69 ("Aliens who have resided for more than a decade in this country,
even those whose status is now unlawful because of technical visa violations, have a strong
liberty interest in remaining in their homes.").
299. Id. at 1069 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)) (quoting the lower
court opinion is this case and acknowledging that there is no actual evidence in the record
showing what percentage of decisions based on classified information result in error).
300. Id. ("[T]he Government has offered no evidence to demonstrate that these particular
aliens threaten the national security of this country .... [and] ... claims that it need not.").
301. Id. (quoting Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)) (discussing the disclosure
of evidence against an individual to be a "relatively immutable" principal of justice where
government action harms an individual and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact
finding).
302. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537
(2006).
303. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 101 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§
1531-1537 (2006)).
304. See Note, supra note 130, at 1971 (describing the ATRC as "created in the
aftermath" of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing).
305. See Carl Tobias, The Process Due Indefinitely Detained Citizens, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1687, 1723 (2007) ("[T]he 1996 alien terrorist removal system ... has yet to be invoked.");
John Dorsett Niles, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of the Alien Terrorist Removal
Court, 57 DUKE L.J. 1833, 1834 (2008); id. at 1863 (postulating that the ATRC's use in
certain situations might lead to an adverse constitutional ruling). The ATRC's lack of use
can probably be attributed to the fact that there are frequently other means of deporting an
alien who the government believes is a terrorist. For example, criminal prosecutions or more
traditional removal proceedings.
306. See Niles, supra note 305, at 1833 ("In theory, the limited nature of the ATRC
protections might implicate resident aliens' Fifth Amendment rights."). But see Townley,
supra note 254, at 227 (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court "has repeatedly hinted that
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ATRC proceedings are initiated when the government submits an ex
parte, in camera request to the removal court and demands a removal
hearing. 30 7 The request must include the identity of the alien, facts showing
that there is probable cause to believe that the alien is a terrorist, and a
demonstration that traditional avenues of removal would pose a risk to the
national security of the United States. 30 8 If the judge determines that there
is such probable cause, he must grant the application for removal. 30 9 Once
this motion is granted, the noncitizen looses all other rights relating to
3 10
removal and deportation.
Despite the secrecy surrounding the invocation of ATRC hearings, the
actual proceedings are open to the public. 3 11 At the outset, the alien is due
"reasonable notice" of the nature of the charges against him, which must
include "a general account of the basis for the charges." 3 12 The alien has a
right to be present for the hearing, to be represented by counsel, to
introduce evidence on his own behalf, to examine the evidence against him,
and to cross-examine any witnesses. 3 13 Despite the existence of these
are "intended to allow an alien to have
procedural protections, none of them
3 14
access to classified information."
The government may make ex parte, in camera submissions of any
evidence it seeks to use that, if disclosed, might pose a threat to national

permanent residents returning from abroad are entitled to more process at the border than
first-time applicants seeking admission").
307. 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2) (requiring that after the government makes a request to
convene the request be filed under seal). The removal court is made up of five district
judges, each from one of the judicial circuits. Id. § 1532(a).
308. Id. § 1533(a)(l)(D)(i)-(iii) (requiring that requests to convene the ATRC also
include proof that the individual in question is an "alien terrorist" and that they are present in
the United States).
309. Id. § 1533(c)(2)(A)-(B). A single judge on the removal court has discretion whether
or not to grant the government's application for removal. Id. § 1533(c)(I)(A)-(B) (allowing
a judge to receive ex parte, in camera testimony and evidence, specifically including
classified information).
310. See id. § 1533(d) ("If an order is issued under this section granting an application,
the rights of the alien regarding removal and expulsion shall be governed solely by this
subchapter, and except as they are specifically referenced in this subchapter, no other
provisions of this chapter shall be applicable."); id. § 1534(k) (stripping relief based on
asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, adjustment of
status, and registry).
311. See id. § 1534(a)(2). Despite application in Article III courts, the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not apply in proceedings for the ATRC. Id. § 1534(h) (stating explicitly that the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in a removal hearing); see also Hall, supra note 269,
at 519-20 ("[T]he statute expressly disclaims the application of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in proceedings before the ATRC.").
312. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(b)(l)-(2) (including the time and place of trial in "reasonable
notice").
313. Id. § 1534(c)(1)-(3) ("The alien shall have a right to be present at such hearing and
to be represented by counsel. Any alien financially unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled
to have counsel assigned to represent the alien.").
314. See id. § 1534(d)(5).
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security. 3 15 The government must submit a summary of the classified
evidence to the removal court. 3 16 If the judge finds that the summary is
"sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a defense," he must approve it
within fifteen days. 3 17 If the judge does not find the document sufficient,
the government is afforded another fifteen days to correct deficiencies. 3 18
If the summary is deemed sufficient, the hearing will go on and the alien
will have use of the substitute.
Where this revised summary is not sufficient, and the government cannot
improve it, the Act provides special procedures for lawful permanent
residents. 3 19 In such situations, the ATRC legislation authorizes the
appointment of a "special attorney. ' 320 "Special attorneys" have security
clearance and are appointed to contest classified evidence on behalf of the
aliens. 321 As in CIPA, the attorney cannot disclose the classified
information to the alien. 322 For aliens without permanent resident status but
who are nonetheless inside the United States and therefore subject to the
ATRC, the hearing continues without a summary and without a
323
representative.
Though both the alien and the government are "given [a] fair opportunity
to present argument[s]," the judge may allow any part of the argument
dealing with evidence that was initially received in camera and ex parte to
be heard outside the presence of the alien. 324 For aliens without the benefit
of a "special attorney," this means that there is no opportunity to challenge
this evidence or the arguments and evidence presented in association with

315. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(A) (allowing submission and ex parte, in camera review of any
evidence that "would pose a risk to the national security of the United States" or any
individual if disclosed).
316. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(B) (requiring submission of an unclassified summary of evidence
that does not pose a risk to national security).
317. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(C) (requiring that if the summary is approved, the government must
deliver it to the alien).
318. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(i)-(ii) (allowing the government to correct deficiencies and
submit a revised, unclassified summary).
319. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F) (providing "[s]pecial procedures" for lawful permanent resident
aliens found within the country and subject to ATRC).
320. Id. (authorizing the court to designate a special attorney to lawful permanent
residents who are otherwise unable to address the evidence against them).
321. See id. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(i)(I)-(II) (noting specifically that appointed attorneys can
challenge the veracity of the classified evidence in in camera proceedings); see also
Chesney, supra note 259, at 33-34 (describing the "special advocate" provision of the
ATRC as "clearly designed to reconcile the competing governmental and individual interests
at stake in this context").
322. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii) (listing sanctions for "special attorney[s]" who violate
the prohibitions on disclosure).
323. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E)(ii) ("[T]he Department of Justice shall cause to be delivered to
the alien a statement that no summary is possible, and the classified information submitted in
camera and ex parte may be used pursuant to this paragraph.").
324. Id. § 1534(f).
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it. In these proceedings, the government must prove removability on the
325
basis of terrorism by a preponderance of the evidence.
4. Critiques of the Use of Secret Evidence in Immigration Settings
In many respects, criticisms of the use of classified evidence in
immigration cases follow the same structure as criticisms of classified
evidence in the criminal context. For example, there is an argument that
secret evidence "short-circuits the adversary process" and is a denial of due
process. 326 As in the criminal context, this argument is based on the idea
that, for the adversarial process to insure a fair hearing, both sides must be
able to examine and respond to the other's evidence. 327 Where the
opportunity to do so is denied, so the argument goes, fair process has also
32 8
been denied.
Despite the similar criticisms, the use of secret information in the
immigration context creates unique difficulties.
Understanding this
depends in part on recognizing the wide breadth of potential negative
outcomes that accompany an adverse finding in the immigration context.
Immigration hearings can lead to deportation, the loss of a home and work,
the separation of families, 329 and lengthy periods of detention. 330 Also
specific to the immigration setting is the risk that the use of secret evidence
will "decrease[] the legitimacy" of our immigration system and cause an
increase in terrorism by "alienating immigrant communities." 33 1 Plainly,
the potential loss created by the denial of a fair hearing in the immigration
setting is similar but distinct from an unfair denial of process in the criminal
context.
In addition, the procedures employed in immigration hearings are
especially open to abuse. While this is, again, an argument made with
respect to the use of classified information in criminal cases, it raises

325. Id. § 1534(g) (stating that it is the government's burden to prove the alien's
removability).
326. See David Cole Testimony, supra note 278, at 43 (introducing a catalogue of
criticisms of the use of secret evidence in immigration cases).
327. See id. ("[W]hat right could be more basic under due process than the right to see the
evidence against you?").
328. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 140, at 307 (arguing that "[t]he very nature of secret
evidence eliminates the adversarial system's traditional test of evidentiary reliability and
accuracy: confrontation").
329. See id. at 292 (describing the failure to "test" secret evidence with the adversarial
process as leading to the wrongful "separation of families"). Much has been written about
Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, aliens coming to this country to live with their spouses. See,
e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention ofAliens: Lessonsfrom the Lives
of Ellen KnauffandIgnatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995).
330. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 140, at 290-91 (citing the detention of innocent men

pending resolution of claims based on secret evidence as a negative effect of such secret
evidence); see also David Cole Testimony, supra note 278, at 42 (describing several clients
who spent years incarcerated pending review only to be released and found not to be a threat
to national security).
331. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 140, at 292.
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significant issues unique to the immigration context. Where evidence has
been improperly classified by one agency, no other agency has the
independent authority to declassify that specific information. 332 Because
immigration authorities frequently use information derived from other
agencies, the use and nondisclosure of information that did not need to be
classified and therefore did not need to be withheld from the alien is
prevalent. 333 Additionally, because substitutes or summaries of classified
evidence are not required, immigration is the only area of the law where
absolutely secret evidence is permitted as evidence in an adversarial
334
setting.
Reliance on evidence that cannot be challenged can lead to practices like
asserting hearsay without producing the original declarant, 335 or simply
asserting evidence that is factually inaccurate. 33 6 In Arar v. Ashcroft,33 7 for
example, an alien traveling through New York City was arrested and
detained on the basis of secret evidence. 338 According to the government,
Maher Arar was a member of Al Qaeda and for this reason inadmissible. 339
Arar never went before an immigration judge, and neither he nor his
40
attorney were ever allowed to see the erroneous evidence against him.3
While the government contended that Arar was on a terror watch list, he
was in fact on a list of possible witnesses, not terrorists, maintained by the

332. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 341, pt. 1II, § 3.1(c)(l)-(4) (1995),
reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 435 note (2000) ("Classified National Security
Information") (giving declassification authority to four specific categories of individuals:
(1) the official who originally classified the information; (2) the successor of the official who
originally classified the information; (3) a supervisory official of either; and (4) officials
specifically delegated declassification authority in writing by the agency head or other senior
agency official).
333. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 140, at 308 (citing In re Ahmed, No. A90-674-238,
slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Immigr. Ct. July 30, 1999)) (describing the Nasser Ahmed case and the
government's reliance on misclassified information, a biased source, and a mischaracterized
document to make its case and keep Ahmed detained for three and a half years); see also
Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kajka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological
Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51, 81 (1999) (describing the use of "biased and unreliable
sources").
334. Even in asylum cases or applications for which there is a preference for the
production of summaries, such substitutes are only to be produced when the agency "can do
so consistently with safeguarding both the classified nature of the information and its
sources." 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1 l(c)(3)(iv) (2007).
335. See David Cole Testimony, supra note 278, at 44 (describing the INS practice of
relying on hearsay during in camera, ex parte proceedings).
336. See Akram, supra note 333, at 81 (describing the use of "deliberately or mistakenly
falsified translations").
337. 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
338. See id. 253-54; see also Ramji-Nogales, supra note 140, at 290 (citing Arar as
"perhaps the best-known recent example of misuse of secret evidence in immigration
proceedings").
339. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (describing the INS finding of temporary
inadmissibility based upon an asserted association with Al Qaeda).
340. Id. at 253-54 (describing the events of Arar's incarceration from the time of his
arrest to his receipt of his final removal order "without further inquiry before an immigration
judge").
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Canadian Government. 34 1 All of this came out only after he was rendered
to Syria, where he was imprisoned and tortured. 342 Similarly, in the case of
Hany Kiareldeen, a heavily biased source that could not be challenged was
used as the basis of secret evidence against him. 343 Without the ability to
confront the evidence, Kiareldeen, an alien, was left with no means to
challenge the veracity of the statements or expose any bias inherent to the
witness testimony.
The ATRC has come under very specific and focused attack. The
majority of critics argue that, under Mathews v. Eldridge, the interest of a
resident alien to remain in the United States is "weighty." 344 Based on this,
there is a concern that the use of a special attorney for lawfully admitted
permanent residents is insufficient to pass constitutional muster. 345 This is
compounded by the concern that an appointed attorney would not be able to
work with his client without somehow inadvertently informing him of the
government's evidence. 346 On the other hand, one supporter of the system
has argued that an appointed attorney would owe the alien a "fiduciary
duty" and would therefore be loyal and able to adequately represent the
alien. 34 7 Another potential issue is that unlawful or temporary resident
attorney, leaving
aliens can be denied both summary evidence and a special
348
the alien with absolutely no way to contest his removal.

341. See id. at 256 n. I (describing a letter submitted by Arar containing publicly available
information that he was included on a list of potential witnesses to terrorism).
342. See id. 254-55 (describing Arar's treatment in Syria where he was forced to sleep in
a "grave" cell, interrogated, beaten, and tortured).
343. See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (D.N.J. 1999) (relying on
information provided by petitioner's ex-wife).
344. See Niles, supra note 305, at 1852 (listing and comparing descriptions used by
various scholars and commentators in describing an alien's interest in remaining in the
United States, and noting the propensity to describe it as "weighty," "great," "substantial," or
another like term). John Dorsett Niles also notes that commentators similarly weigh the
government's interest, describing it as "tremendously important," "strong," and "heavy." Id.
(footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
345. See David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for
Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 47, 136 (noting that
even a "tough and demanding" attorney will be impaired by his inability to share information
with his client).
346. See id. (characterizing this possibility as a theoretical conflict of interest that might

exist between attorneys and their clients in ATRC settings).
347. See id. at 1859-60 (acknowledging that an interview would be "cumbersome" but
arguing that "[a] forward-looking attorney... could circumvent any potential problem by
comprehensively interviewing the alien before reviewing the government's secret
evidence").
348. See Niles, supra note 305, at 1860, 1862-63 (suggesting that by treating unlawful

and temporary resident aliens the same as lawful, permanent resident aliens and appointing a
special attorney in every case, the ATRC would be cured of any constitutional problems).
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C. The Military Commissions Act and ClassifiedEvidence
1. Background of the Military Commissions Act
Part II.B discussed the various procedures and standards governing
reliance on classified evidence in immigration hearings. Part II.C focuses
on the most recent congressionally adopted scheme providing for the use of
classified evidence in a judicial forum, the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA). 349 On his first day in office, Barack Obama ordered an
immediate stop to the military commissions process pending a review of the
system as it currently operates. 350 However, even as the future of the
commissions system remains unknown, there is much to be gained from an
examination of the evidentiary rules and standards that regulate classified
information in this forum.
Enacting the first military commission of any kind in the United States
since World War 11,351 the MCA was passed in response to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Hamdan, which found the initial executive order
establishing military commissions unlawful. 352 The MCA was designed
specifically to try "alien unlawful enemy combatants" in the wake of
September 11, 2001.353 Even with the MCA in place, however, only
354
twenty-seven detainees have been charged.
The first detainee to be charged by the military commission was Salim
Hamdan in 2004.355 Initially charged under the military commission
legislation found unlawful in the Supreme Court case bearing his name,
Hamdan was eventually charged under the MCA. 356 Ultimately, Hamdan
was acquitted of all conspiracy charges and convicted of the separate,
arguably lesser, charge of material support for terrorism. 357 Hamdan was

349. See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w (2006).
350. Editorial, First Steps at Guantinamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A32 ("Before
midnight of his first day in office, [Barack Obama] took the obvious and vital step of halting
the military tribunals at the prison camp.").
351. William Glaberson, Judge's Guantinamo Ruling Bodes Ill
for System, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 2008, at A26.
352. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (finding military commissions
established in response to Bush's November 13, 2001, order to have been wrongfully
convened without congressional authority). For a history of the legislation, Supreme Court
cases, and policy that lead to the creation of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), see
supra Part I.C.3.
353. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a (1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006) (defining an unlawful combatant as anyone
who sat through a CSRT proceeding, has "engaged in hostilities," has "purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents," and "is not a
lawful enemy combatant").
354. WITTES ET AL., supra note 24, at 5.
355. Hamdan was first charged in July 2004 pursuant to Military Order No. 1, the first
executive order establishing commissions. Stephen Ellmann, The "Rule of Law" and the
Military Commission, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 761, 762 (2007).
356. See William Glaberson, Panel Convicts Bin Laden Driver in Split Verdict, N.Y
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008, at Al.

357. Id.
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sentenced to five and a half years in prison with credit to be given for the
sixty-one months he had already been held.35 8 David Hicks, an Australian
national formerly held at Guantdnamo, was also charged and accused of
training with Al Qaeda and working with the Taliban. 359 Hicks pled guilty
36 1
and finished his term in Australia. 360 He has since been released.
Ali Hamza Ahmad al-Bahlul, the most recent detainee sentenced, did not
participate in his trial as a means of protesting the authority of the
Qaeda, Bahlul's
commission. 362 The so-called "propaganda chief' of Al
36 3
trial took one week and Bahlul was given a life sentence.
2. MCA Procedures for the Use and Protection of Classified Information
The MCA contains clear rules as to when and how classified information
can be used as evidence. Unlike CIPA, which has specific rules for
discovery and trial, the rules regarding the use of classified information in
military commissions apply to all stages of the commissions. 364 For
information to be considered privileged, the "head of the executive or
military department or government agency concerned" must make a finding
that the information is properly classified and that the disclosure of this
365
information would be "detrimental to the national security."
Importantly, witnesses and trial counsel for the prosecution are presumed to
have the authority of the head of the relevant executive agency to invoke
366
the privilege.
Like CIPA, the MCA authorizes substitutions of classified evidence.
Where government counsel makes a motion to protect classified
information and the military judge finds it "is relevant and necessary to an
element of the offense or a legally cognizable defense," 367 the military
judge "shall authorize" one of three alternatives to disclosure to defense

358. William Glaberson, Panel Sentences Bin Laden Driverto a Short Term, N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 8, 2008, at Al.
359. Terror Detainee Back in Australia, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, at A8.
360. Id. As part of his deal for an earlier release, he has forgone all future suits relating to
conditions of confinement at Guantdnamo and agreed not to speak with the press for one
year. Id.
36 1. Raymond Bonner, Full Freedomfor FormerAustralian Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2008, at A12.
362. William Glaberson, Detainee Convicted on Terrorism Charges: A Second
Guantnamo Trial Victory for the Bush Administration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at A19.

363. Id.
364. See 10 U.S.C. § 949d(f)(l)(A) (2006) (requiring that rules on the treatment of
classified information be applied throughout the stages of military commissions).
365. Id. § 949d(f)(l)(B)(ii).
366. Id. § 949d(f)(1)(C) (presuming that representatives, witnesses, and trial counsel have
authority to claim privilege from disclosure).
367. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS pt. 3, rule 505(h)(4)

(2007) [hereinafter MMC], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/MANUAL%20
FOR%2OMILITARY%20COMMISSIONS%202007%20signed.pdf (providing the standard
for disclosure of classified information or a substitute or summary of such information).
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counsel to the extent that such alternatives are "practicable. ' 368 The three
possible alternatives to disclosure contemplated by the act are (1) redaction
of specific classified sections of a document, (2) substitution of a part of the
document with unclassified information, and (3) substitution of facts that
the classified information tends to prove. 369 In determining whether or not
a substitution is "practicable," the judge may consider "any relevant
factor." 370 The same methods of substitution apply to any and all
3 71
exculpatory evidence that must be disclosed.
If the military judge finds that a proposed substitute of otherwise
admissible information upon which the government seeks to rely is
"inadequate or impracticable" and the government objects to a substitute
suggested by the military judge, then the judge may issue a sanction. 372
The possible sanctions are similar to those available under CIPA:
(A) striking or precluding all or part of the testimony of a witness at trial;
(B) declaring a mistrial;
(C) finding against the Government on any issue as to which the evidence
is probative and material to the defense;
(D) dismissing the charges, with or without prejudice; or
(E) dismissing the charges or specifications or both to which the
information relates with or without prejudice. 373
In addition to providing for substitutions, the MCA contemplates the
admissibility of evidence even where classified sources, methods, and
activities by which evidence was acquired are excluded, as long as the
evidence is deemed reliable. 374 The MCA does not set standards for
reliability in this context. In such situations, the military judge may require
that an unclassified summary of the excluded information be given to the
368. See 10 U.S.C. § 949d(f)(2)(A) (giving no guidance on what is meant by the term
"practicable").
369. Id. § 949d(f)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (listing deletion alternatives to disclosure of classified
information).
370. MMC, supra note 367, pt. 2, rule 701(f)(4). Potential factors for evaluating
practicability include
the burden that producing the alternatives would impose on the Government, the
time it would take to produce the alternative, the degree to which a summary could
be provided consistent with national security, whether the evidence is cumulative
of or distinct from other evidence available to the defense, the relevance and
materiality of the evidence to the preparation of the defense, and the significance
of the evidence in comparison with other evidence to which the defense has access.
Id.
371. See 10 U.S.C. § 949j(d) (requiring the government to provide adequate substitutions
of all classified exculpatory evidence).
372. MMC, supra note 367, pt. 3, rule 505(e)(4)(A)-(E) (listing possible sanctions).
373. Id.
374. See 10 U.S.C. § 949d(f)(2)(B) (allowing admission of evidence without sources
upon motion by trial counsel and finding by military judge that evidence is reliable and that
the sources are classified).
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long
commission and the defense (both the attorney and the defendant), as 375
as the production of the summary is "consistent with national security."
An incident in the case of Salim Hamdan provides an example of how
problems of access to classified information are adjudicated under the
MCA. Defense counsel sought access to the names of three witnesses who
could be seen in a videotaped investigation provided by the government.
The government willingly identified one witness, the principal investigator,
but submitted ex parte, in camera, classified documents in an effort to prove
that disclosure of the other two witnesses, an interpreter and another
individual briefly on the tape, would harm national security. The judge
considered the ex parte motion in light of the discovery rule requiring that
"no party may unreasonably impede... access of another party." 376 The
judge accepted the government's assertion of the national security privilege
with respect to one witness but found that their argument with respect to the
other was "merely an assertion." 377 Rather than granting unfettered access
to the defendant and defense counsel, however, the judge made provisions
whereby the witness could call the defense at an appointed time and answer
questions378about the circumstances of the videotape without identifying
himself.
The records from Hamdan's military commission also illustrate the
extent to which access to witnesses held in custody by the government
complicates the issue of access to classified information. The defense
at
sought access, via written questions, to certain detainees held 380
379 The commission granted access via written questions.
Guantdnamo.
The defense prepared questions and then provided them to a Court Security
Officer (CSO) with the authority to redact the questions for national
security purposes. The CSO delivered the questions to the detainees, and
the detainees' responses were returned in the same manner, again giving the

375. See id. § 949d(f)(2)(B). The MCA does not differentiate between the "defense
counsel" and the "defendant" in its terminology. Notably, even the military commission
may not get to see either the summary or the "sources, methods or activities" by which
evidence is obtained if it is determined classified. Id. ("The military judge may require trial
counsel to present to the military commission and the defense ... an unclassified summary
of the sources ...by which the United States acquired the evidence.").
376. See United States v. Hamdan, No. D018, slip op. at I (Military Comm'n Apr. 21,
2008), available at http://preview.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2008/HAMDAN%20D01 8%20

RULING.pdf (finding the relevant standard to be that each party must have "adequate
opportunity" to prepare their case).
377. Id. at 2 (describing the government's assertion of privilege as to the second witness
as "merely an assertion by counsel" but failing to explore the substance of either privilege
claim in detail).
378. Id. (explaining that this procedure would allow a direct defense interview of the
witness without necessarily giving away the witness's identity).
379. United States v. Hamdan, No. DOI 1, slip op. at I (Military Comm'n June 4, 2008),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/D-011-Ruling%20on%20Access%20to%20

High%20Value%20Detainees.pdf (describing the process by which questions were delivered
to the detainees).
380. Id.
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CSO an opportunity to redact the answers. 38 1 After receiving the redacted
answers of former Al Qaeda operative Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the
defense made a motion for the commission to undertake an in camera
review of the redacted statements to determine if they should be disclosed
to the defendant and counsel. 382 The government objected, arguing that the
MCA places "the duty to protect classified information on its shoulders. '383
Accordingly, government counsel argued that they, rather than the court,
must be able to inspect the answers to determine whether or not the defense
should be allowed to access the document. 3 84 The military judge denied the
defense motion for in camera review excluding the government. 3 85 Instead,
the court found that "[i]f the defense wants access to those answers" the
government counsel must be allowed to review the questions and determine
386
whether or not defense counsel should have access.
Objections based on disclosure of classified information can be made by
the government at any point throughout the trial, including the examination
of witnesses. 387 The MCA contemplates that trial counsel may not be
certain what information is classified without further consultation and
therefore allows for a delay in proceedings for the purposes of discussion
with agency heads and superiors. 388 Additionally, military judges are given
the option of conducting in camera and ex parte review of the government's
claim of privilege before making a determination about the admissibility or
disclosure of a specific piece of information. 389 In spite of its tight
regulation of classified sources, the MCA requires that the defendant be
present "at all sessions" of the military commission. 390
3. Critiques of the MCA
Muneer Ahmad, visiting professor at Georgetown Law Center and
former lawyer for Guantdnamo detainees in both the civil and military
commission context, points out an inconsistency in the MCA that allows the
government to use evidence obtained under torture. 39 1 The MCA contains
explicit provisions prohibiting the use of statements obtained through
381. Id. ("[T]he Commission authorized the CSO to redact any portions of the questions
or answers that he considered appropriate to redact ....
").
382. Id. (indicating that the desired review would be by the commission alone and not
government counsel).
383. Id.

384. Id. at 1-2 (describing the government argument that it is the job of government trial
counsel to control and protect classified information).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 2.
387. See 10 U.S.C. § 949d(f)(2)(C) (2006) (allowing objection to any question, line of
inquiry, or motion to admit evidence).
388. See id.

389. Id.
390. Id. § 949a(b)(B) (providing exceptions for commission deliberation, voting, and
when the defendant is behaving in a disruptive manner).
391. See Muneer Ahmad, Resisting Guantfinamo: Rights at the Brink ofDehumanization,
103 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 58 n.216, on file with author).
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torture; however, it also includes the provision discussed above, allowing
the government to introduce evidence without revealing classified sources
and methods of interrogation as long as the military judge finds that the
evidence is "reliable." 392 As Professor Ahmad notes,
Because hearsay evidence is generally admissible, the MCA may permit
intelligence officers to testify to statements made by the defendant or
others, without the defense having a meaningful opportunity to inquire
raising the specter of a
into or challenge the methods of interrogation, thus
39 3
laundering of evidence obtained through torture.

David Glazier, Loyola Law School professor and scholar of military
justice and national security law, notes broader concerns of legitimacy. He
raises questions about the validity of the commissions' jurisdiction over
detainees, the failure of the commissions to comport with the Third Geneva
Convention and International Humanitarian Law, and the commissions'
potential lack of subject matter jurisdiction to hear material support charges
and other charges that are not war crimes. 394 Glazier also notes the
potential for the commissions to be a "procedural due-process disaster"
because they deny detainee access to much of the evidence against them
and present many difficulties for detainees attempting to construct a
395
defense.
Another concern is the growing number of scandals that have developed
surrounding the specific military judges involved in the commissions.
Lieutenant Colonel Darrel Vandeveld, the chief prosecutor in the case of
Mohammed Jawad, recently left his position within the tribunals, seeking
reassignment elsewhere within the military. 396 In a declaration submitted to
the commission, he explained his decision to resign: "I am highly
concerned, to the point that I believe I can no longer serve as a prosecutor at
the Commissions, about the slipshod, uncertain 'procedure' for affording
defense counsel discovery." 397 Further, he detailed the observations upon
which his concern was based:
I have observed that a number of defense requests which I considered to
be reasonable and in some cases indicated support for were nevertheless
rejected by the Convening Authority, presumably on the advice of the
Legal Advisor.

392. See id. (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 948r(b)-949d(f)(2)).
393. See id. (citing 10 U.S.C § 949a(b)(2)(E)).
394. David W. Glazier, If I Could Turn Back Time: Re-lawyering the "War on Terror"
63-65 (Loyola Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 2008-30, 2008), available at
=
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id 1280391.
See
id.
(noting
the
"fairly
substantial
body"
of war crimes law establishing that
395.
denial of a fair trial is a war crime).
396. Josh Meyer, For Lawyer, Trial Was Tribulation; GuantanamoProsecutor Who Quit
Had 'Grave Misgivings'AboutFairness, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at Al.
397. Declaration of Lieutenant Colonel Darrel J. Vandeveld at 3, United States v.
Mohammed Jawad (Military Comm'n Sept. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
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. . . [D]iscovery in even the simplest of cases is incomplete or

unreliable. To take the Jawad case as only one example-a case where no
intelligence agency had any significant involvement-I discovered just
yesterday that something as basic as agents' interrogation notes had been
entered into a database, to which I do not have personal access, on or
about 11 August 2008. These and other examples too legion to list, are
not only appalling, they deprive the accused of basic due process and
subject the well-intentioned prosecutor to claims of ethical misconduct. 398
Lieutenant Colonel Vandeveld was at least the sixth officer of the Judge
Advocate General's Corp to either resign or request transfer based on
concerns about the fairness of the tribunals. 399
Lieutenant Colonel Vandeveld is not alone in his concerns about the
proceedings. In the second of two motions to dismiss for undue influences,
Jawad's counsel submitted a letter to George W. Bush from the American
Bar Association (ABA) expressing concern over the lack of due process
afforded in the commissions. 4 00 The ABA objected to the fact the
commissions do not comport with the Uniform Code of Military Justice or
U.S. international treaty obligations. 40 1 Specifically, the ABA pointed out
that detainees cannot select their own counsel, have limited, tightly
controlled access to information, and that their counsels have limited access
to "fundamental information" relating to the defense of the detainee. 4 02
Further, the ABA objected to the military commissions' willingness to
accept hearsay and information obtained through coercion. The ABA
raised specific concerns with respect to the fact that a finding of the death
penalty could result from such information. 40 3
III. REGULATED ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: GIVING
SUBSTANCE TO A "MEANINGFUL REVIEW"

Part II of this Note explored three different strategies for regulating
access to classified evidence in different judicial contexts. Adopted in very
different circumstances, each scheme provides an example of judicial or
congressional efforts to balance individual rights and national security
concerns. Part III of this Note evaluates the appropriate use of classified
evidence in the habeas corpus litigation brought by detainees held at
Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, in light of the three examples explored in Part II
and the mandate of a "meaningful review." This part recommends that

398. Id. at 2-3.
399. Meyer, supra note 396.
400. See Defense Motion to Dismiss for Unlawful Influence, Attachment 9, at 1, Jawad,
No. D004 (Military Comm'n May 20, 2008) (letter from William H. Neukom, President,
Am.
Bar
Ass'n,
to
President
George
W.
Bush),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jawad%20-%20D%20-%20004%20Motion%20to%2ODis
miss%20Unlawful%201nfluence%202.pdf.
401. See id.
402. Id. Attachment 9, at 2.
403. Id.
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procedural legislation be adopted to control the use of classified evidence
and assure basic rights for the detainees.
A. What Boumediene Requires: Reconciling ClassifiedEvidence and a
"MeaningfidReview"
In the long history of habeas corpus jurisprudence, Boumediene's
mandate of a "meaningful review" was in many respects a rearticulation of
a right previously recognized by the Court. As explained in INS v. St. Cyr
and reasserted in Rasul v. Bush, the writ's function is to review the legality
of detentions. 40 4 Challenges to executive detentions, like the current
Guantdnamo petitions, traditionally trigger the highest level of procedural
protections. 40 5 In providing a strong affirmation of the writ, the Supreme
Court in Boumediene neither created a binding procedural structure for the
Guantdnamo habeas cases nor posited a potential framework that would
allow vindication of detainee rights.40 6 In lieu of fixed rules, the Court
emphasized the traditionally adaptable and flexible nature of habeas and
articulated broad principles to guide the lower courts. 40 7 The guiding
admonition continues to be that "the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the
prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held
40 8
pursuant to 'the erroneous application or interpretation' of relevant law."
The Court did, however, identify specific procedural failings of the
CSRT and DTA review processes that prevent these forms of review from
being adequate habeas substitutes. 40 9 This set of objections provides, in
essence, procedural minimums for the habeas proceedings in district court
and requires at least some detainee access to classified information. In
assessing the CSRT process, the Court was most concerned with the
petitioners' inability to rebut the evidence against them.4 10 To the extent
that the government is relying upon classified information to which
petitioners are denied access, the habeas hearings replicate one of the flaws
that rendered the CSRTs an inadequate substitute for the writ. Of the four
two are even more
specific problems identified within this broader concern,
411
directly implicated by the use of classified evidence.
First, the Court objected to the inability of detainees in CSRT hearings to
learn of the most critical allegations against them. 412 While all of the
CMOs issued thus far have required that an unclassified factual return be
made available to detainees, none have required that substitutes for
404. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.

407. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
408. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266 (2008) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
409. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
410. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
411. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting four flaws identified by the
Supreme Court that prevent the CSRT process from being an adequate habeas substitute).
412. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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classified information be provided to the detainee. 4 13 If the unclassified
factual returns contained more substantive information, the lack of required
substitutes would be of less importance. The unclassified Boumediene
factual return reveals, however, that there is the potential for an unclassified
factual return to communicate very little substantive information. 4 14 Fortyeight out of fifty-three pages are completely redacted, greatly challenging
petitioner's ability to know the substance of the government's allegations
against him. 4 15 Additionally, the idea that more than ninety percent of the
information the government has submitted to the court as a demonstration
of their authority to detain is noncritical is simply not credible. Without
some form of regulated access to classified evidence, this critical failing of
the CSRTs will contaminate habeas hearings as well.
Second, the Supreme Court identified the CSRTs' near total reliance on
hearsay as a failing. 4 16 Where, as contemplated by Judge Hogan's CMO, 4 17
the court can view classified information that is not shown to either the
petitioner or his counsel, there is a high risk that the evidence will be
hearsay. In spite of the Court's understandable distaste for hearsay, the
Court did not indicate that the admissibility of hearsay alone would be a
fatal flaw. Where neither the petitioner nor counsel can see the hearsay,
however, it runs the risk of going completely unchallenged. To effectively
guard against unreliable hearsay and provide petitioners with an opportunity
to rebut the allegations against them, courts must adopt regulations that will
allow petitioners to know, at minimum, the basic contents of the allegations
against them.
The Boumediene Court also faulted the CSRTs for their "closed and
accusatorial" nature. 418 Thus far, the habeas hearings have been closed to
the petitioners and to the public, and as such seem to approach the closed
hearings so frowned upon by the Court in Boumediene.4 19 While the
presence of an attorney at these hearings ameliorates the situation and
provides a distinctly higher level of process than that which was provided in
the CSRTs, it does not erase the risks and dangers inherent in a closed
proceeding. 420 Petitioners, even in their absence, are encouraged to present
evidence through their representative. Because they are unaware of the
substance of the government's allegations and are not present for the
hearing, the extent to which they are actually able to do so, however,
remains unclear. As discussed throughout Part I, where an attorney cannot
communicate to his client the substance of specific allegations charged by
the government, challenging the allegations is very difficult regardless of

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

See supra notes 153, 165 and accompanying text.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.

2009]

"MEANINGFUL REVIEW" AT GUANTANAMO

2723

the actual truth. 42 1 Additionally, having the benefit of a representative does
not preclude the implicit unfairness of being entirely excluded from your
own hearing. This inherent unfairness has long been recognized by U.S.
courts. 422 Where neither the public nor the very individual whose rights are

a stake are present for a hearing, classification of the hearing as anything
but closed is quite difficult.
An individual's right to see and confront the evidence against him comes
out of a tradition of criminal law and constitutional rights,42 3 however it is
relevant to any context where a fundamentally fair and meaningful review
of facts and law has been guaranteed. Moreover, the Boumediene decision
indicates that at least some level of due process is due to the detainees held
on Guantdnamo. Both the Court's reliance on the Mathews test to evaluate
the procedural adequacy of the CSRT process, and its holding that the
detainees have a fight to habeas corpus guaranteed by the Constitution
suggest that the Constitution reaches those held at Guantdnamo. 424 The
Court's articulated concern over the "sum total of procedural protections
afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and collateral," further supports
425
this notion.
Detainee access to classified evidence relied on by the government to
prepare for, and respond during, the hearing is essential to the other
procedural protections extended throughout the habeas hearing. 426 If a
petitioner cannot examine the evidence against him, he cannot help his
attorneys prepare a response by offering specific counterproofs to the
evidence against him.427 The CSRT record of Mustafa Ait Idir reveals the
difficulties of responding to allegations that one cannot see. 428 The logic of
traditional jurisprudence is consistent, even in this novel area of the law:
where the government's action will injure an individual and the assessment
of that action is based on a finding of fact, "the Government's case must be
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is
untrue." 429 These problems are only intensified in the context of the
4 30
attorney-client relationship that exists at Guantdnamo.
The use of classified information creates a very high risk that procedural
process problems of the type discussed above will be encountered. To
avoid this, a clear rule must be adopted to allow petitioners regulated access
to classified evidence. This Note supports a legislative, rather than judicial
solution. Adoption of a statute to govern the use of classified information
in this context would avoid the multiplicity of standards that are already
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-24, 132 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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developing in the proliferation of numerous case management orders and
the varying definitions4 3of
exculpatory information that have developed at
1
the district court level.

Part III.A. of this Note argued that regulated access to classified evidence
is required to provide a meaningful review of the type ordered in
Boumediene. This Note now considers the three models previously
discussed. Part III.B addresses the reasons that the procedural regimes
developed in the immigration context are not appropriate for the habeas
context, and Part III.C similarly provides an argument against adopting the
procedures from the military commissions. Part III.D argues that, in
crafting a procedural mechanism for controlling the use of classified
evidence, Congress should look directly to CIPA as a model.
B. Proceduresfrom the Immigration Context Are Not Appropriatefor
Adoption in the Habeas Cases
The procedures used to regulate classified information in immigration
law are neither clear enough in how they should be applied nor protective
enough of individual rights for use in this setting. The use of classified
information in classified removal proceedings, with essentially zero access
432
for petitioners, would not be sufficient in the Guantdnamo setting.
Though the Guantftnamo detainees are noncitizens held outside of the
United States, they have been brought within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
by the U.S. government and have been found to have at least some specific
constitutional rights.4 33 The complete denial of access to classified
information in the summary proceedings afforded aliens in expedited
removal hearings 434 utterly fails to comport with the Boumediene
meaningful review standard, which unequivocally requires that petitioners
be provided with a "meaningful opportunity" to challenge their
435
detention.
The standards applied in discretionary relief hearings are likewise
inappropriate. Summaries of classified evidence are provided to aliens
seeking discretionary relief only when "consistent[]" with national
security. 4 36
But, unlike aliens seeking discretionary relief, habeas
43 7
not seek relief that is based on "unfettered discretion."
do
petitioners
Rather, they seek relief based on rights firmly embedded in the Constitution
and that the Supreme Court has recently and explicitly validated as
438
accessible to the petitioners.

431.
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434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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If any area of immigration law is applicable or can be analogized to the
detainees at Guantdnamo, it is the logic of those discretionary relief cases
dealing with permanent residents. Both the detainees and permanent
residents are within the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. And, like permanent
residents, the Guantdnamo detainees have been guaranteed some level of
constitutional protection. 439 Following the logic of Al Najjar and
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, a procedural due process
violation would surely result from a failure to disclose evidence when the
detainees' interests in relief are so pressing and procedures can so easily be
changed to better address their interests. 440
The government has an
obvious interest both in detaining those men who truly are a threat to our
national security and in preventing the disclosure of sensitive national
security information, but the risk that the detainees would be erroneously
denied meaningful review through the use of classified information is too
441
great to ignore.
The logic of Al Najjar and American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee does not, however, provide an affirmative standard by which to
measure the level of process that should be due to detainees. Each case
determined only that the aliens involved had been given too little process
rather than articulating the appropriate procedures that should govern
permanent resident access to classified evidence. 442 Additionally, although
the detainees are due some level of constitutional protection, they are not
permanent residents. The weighty interests of the alien and the detainee are
distinct: the alien faces deportation and potential separation from his
family, friends, life, and work; the detainee faces indefinite detention far
away from his family and home. While aliens face the ominous threat of
deportation, the Guantdtnamo detainees face years of solitary detention in a
strange land. More obviously, and cutting the other way, the detainees have
never actually lived within the United States and therefore are not
traditionally due the same level of constitutional protections. 4 43 These
distinctions make it difficult and perhaps inappropriate to draw too strong a
parallel between the two groups.
Likewise, the ATRC would insufficiently protect detainee rights to
satisfy the meaningful review standard. Using the ATRC as a model, the
detainee would be provided reasonable notice of the type of charges against
445
him 444 and would be present for the hearing and represented by counsel.
He would not, however, be guaranteed even qualified access to classified
information. For example, if the government could not create an adequate
summary of the information, a detainee treated like a permanent resident
439. See supra note 433 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
442. See supra note 290 and accompanying text; see also supra note 297 and
accompanying text.
443. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
444. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
445. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
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under the statute would be appointed a lawyer with access, while a detainee
treated like an alien without permanent resident status would be denied
even that. 446 Additionally, despite guaranteeing the presence of the alien,
the ATRC explicitly allows for ex parte, in camera presentation of
evidence, 44 7 exactly the type
of "closed and accusatorial" setting prohibited
44 8
by the Boumediene Court.
C. Proceduresfrom the MCA Are Not Appropriatefor Adoption in the
Habeas Cases
The MCA requires the production of summaries or substitutes of
classified evidence for detainees 449 and provides judges with an array of
sanctions where the government is unable to comply with this
requirement. 4 50 From this perspective, it is quite similar to CIPA. Still,
other provisions within the MCA make its treatment of classified
information insufficient under the Boumediene meaningful review standard.
The generally acknowledged problems with overclassification 4 51
discussed earlier are exacerbated in this context by the fact that the original
classifying authorities and agency heads are not required to assess the
legitimate need to have specific documents remain classified. 4 52 Rather
than assessing the appropriateness of classified information independently,
agency heads are presumed to have delegated their authority to witnesses
and trial counsel participating in the tribunals. 453 This de facto finding of
the privilege effectively allows government counsel to wrongfully withhold
information and discourages the declassification of documents that might
no longer need to be classified. Consider the following hypothetical
situation: a military prosecutor seeks to rely on a classified document
containing hearsay. After some consideration, he is reasonably sure that the
information would no longer cause harm to national security. Knowing that
he has the power to invoke classification independently may encourage this
hypothetical prosecutor to invoke the privilege when it is not actually called
for, simply in an effort to avoid adversarial challenges to the document.
The MCA's grant of this power to the counsel working on an adversarial
case fosters a level of abuse for which the military commissions are
known 454 and certainly undermines efforts to allow meaningful judicial
review. The risk of such abuse is especially great where a significant
455
concentration of evidence remains in the government's control.
446.
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451.
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See supra notes 317-23 and accompanying text.
See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 368-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 372-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
See supra note 366 and accompanying text,
Id.
See supra notes 397-99 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 379-86 and accompanying text (describing difficulties of

interviewing witnesses held in government custody).
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The MCA provides for substitutions but the MCA itself contains a
provision that would allow the prosecution to easily avoid being forced to
actually produce such substitutions. Section 949d(f)(2)(B) allows the
admission of evidence without identifying the sources of the information,
the methods of obtaining the information, or the intelligence activities used
to generate the information. 45 6 As Professor Ahmad points out, this allows
the use of evidence obtained under torture, 457 but it also allows the use of
unseen and unchallenged information more generally.
By allowing
evidence without sources, the sources themselves can remain classified and
unknown to the defense. This may deeply undercut both the value of the
information to the defense and the defense's ability to challenge the validity
of the evidence. It is clear from the cases involving biased sources in the
immigration context that the source of information or the methods used to
obtain it is often what makes evidence most vulnerable to attack on
confrontation. 458 Additionally, the act of confronting an evidentiary source
has long been accepted by our justice system as the best means of assuring
45 9
its validity.
D. CIPA Should Be Adopted in the Habeas Cases
In adopting legislation for this purpose, Congress should follow the
recent decision by the D.C. Circuit, Al Odah v. United States,460 and look
directly to CIPA as a model. Indeed, though the Court applied CIPA "by
analogy," it did so directly and used the procedural construct to evaluate a
46 1
question of access to classified information in the habeas context.
Besides this most recent use, CIPA's demonstrated success prosecuting
terrorism shows that there is a way to balance national security and
individuals' rights without offending the Constitution. 462 Though CIPA
certainly has its detractors, 463 and is designed for criminal cases, it could be
4 64
easily adapted for use in the habeas setting.
CIPA strikes the appropriate balance between individual rights and the
government's interest in security. While many critics of CIPA focus on the
defendant's lack of access to the evidence, they do not respond to the fact
that ultimately, under CIPA, a defendant is guaranteed an "adequate[]
substitute" of the information. 46 5 In guaranteeing access to the substance of
the charges against you, CIPA is the most petitioner-friendly model of any

456. See supra note 374 and accompanying test.
457. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
458. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.

459.
460.
167-78
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
No. 05-5117, 2009 WL 564310, at *7 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2009); see also supra notes
and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 230-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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of those existing in either the criminal or immigration contexts. 4 66
Allowing unfettered access to classified information would not show
appropriate deference to the Supreme Court's admonition that lower courts
must respect the government's interest in source and intelligence
protection. 46 7 As the court of appeals indicated in Al Odah, "alternatives
should . . . be available in habeas if the district court determines that a

proposed admission or summary" would adequately protect petitioner's
right to a meaningful review. 468 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit considered access
to summaries of evidence relied on by the government so reasonable that a
court can order substitutes
even if the information summarized is not
4 69
"material" to the case.

Where an adequate substitute cannot be crafted, the government need not,
as some critics suggest, immediately drop a case. 47 0 Other, more
incremental sanctions are available under CIPA and could easily be
incorporated in the habeas context. 4 71 These sanctions, if actively used,
would encourage the government to rely only on its best, most reliable
information and to craft the best substitutes possible.
Those who, like former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, believe that
CIPA will allow widespread disclosure of classified information and
interrupt our national security, should be reminded that each counsel with
access to classified information must adhere to the rigorous standards of
security clearance 472 and that represented individuals
see only summaries or
473
substitutions of national security information.
The adoption of a flexible statute like CIPA would lead to the application
of uniform standards throughout the habeas context without hampering the
role of the federal judges in crafting a fair procedure. Uniform standards
would also help to prevent the proliferation of various and conflicting
4 74
standards among the district court judges handling these cases.
Unfortunately, the adoption of differing standards at the district court level
466. In expedited removal situations, classified or otherwise secret evidence can be used
ex parte and in camera without disclosure to the alien. See supra note 264 and accompanying
text. In the discretionary relief context, a substitution or summary of the classified
information used to oppose requested relief is required only where it is "consistent with" the
classified and sensitive nature of the documents. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
While the ATRC requires "sufficient substitutions," it does so only if the government is able
to craft such a document. If not, no substitution is required. Without a substitution, all cases
go forward and only lawful permanent residents are given a cleared representative who will
have access to the information. See supra note 323 and accompanying text. The military
commissions require substitutions but have other provisions that enable this requirement to
be easily evaded. See supra note 456 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
468. Al Odah v. United States, No. 05-5117, 2009 WL 564310, at *7 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6,
2009); see also supra note 177 and accompanying text.
469. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
470. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
472. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
473. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
474. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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has already begun in the form of different case management orders and
standards for discovery, creating a risk of contradictory findings. 4 75 A firm
set of rules governing the admissibility and discoverability of information
would help to avoid needless litigation over sources at the district court
level. It would also help to eliminate the possibility of bias on the part of
individual judges, whether with respect to the race or background of a
petitioner or to the specific set of facts that the government alleges justify a
given detention. In the context of such highly contested litigation, an
overarching structure of this kind would be very beneficial.
The CIPA model would require a few modifications for use in the habeas
setting. Under CIPA, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure remain the
governing standard for discovery. 476 Whether or not this is the appropriate
standard for habeas cases would need to be reviewed by Congress. A rule
more explicitly adopting the heightened standards of relevance used by
courts in CIPA cases 477 would probably be appropriate here. Additionally,
this Note proposes other minor changes to guarantee that the meaningful
review standard is met. For example, legislation governing the use of
classified evidence in the habeas hearings should ensure that cleared
counsel have a right to contribute to admissibility determinations. At
minimum, detainees would then have a representative who could argue in
their favor as to the admissibility of specific pieces of evidence.
Additionally, following the holding of the Moussaoui court, 478 any statute
adopted by Congress should explicitly provide that counsel for the defense
shall be allowed to participate in hearings over the adequacy of a proposed
substitution. 479 While the judge should remain the ultimate arbiter of
substitution determinations, 480 a representative for the petitioner should
have the opportunity to argue on behalf of detainees. These changes would
have the added benefit of addressing the primary concern of CIPA
detractors who believe that the defendant and defense counsel4 8 1are
improperly excluded from admissibility and discovery determinations.
CONCLUSION
What should be done is you should give me evidence regarding these
accusations because I4 am
not able to give you any evidence. I can just tell
82
you no, and that is it.
This simple plea for evidence from detainee Mustafa Ait Idir during his
CSRT sums up the primary challenge of defending against classified
475. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
476. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 199, 172-75 and accompanying text.
478. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
479. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
480. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
482. MARGULIES, supra note 21, at 164 (quoting Mustafa Ait Idir, Bosnian-Algerian
Detainee, Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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evidence: without knowledge of the facts, there can be no meaningful
opportunity to refute them. Recognizing this, as well as the need to protect
against the unnecessary and potentially harmful disclosure of classified
national security information, this Note advocates for a legislative
framework following the CIPA model to regulate legal standards,
procedures, and access to classified information in the Guantdnamo habeas
cases. The Boumediene majority stated clearly that the habeas petitioners at
Guantdnamo are due meaningful review. The Court balanced this forceful
requirement by reminding lower courts to be mindful of national security
concerns and to be cautious and accommodating while adjudicating the
habeas cases. Additionally, the Court was careful not to tread on the turf of
the district courts, leaving them space to iron out the exact construct of a
habeas hearing that will provide adequate and meaningful review. The
Court was nevertheless clear that any accommodations for national security
concerns must not undermine the purpose of the writ-to effectively
challenge the lawfulness of a petitioner's detention.
While the D.C. Circuit's recent adoption of CIPA by analogy in Al Odah
v. United States is a large step toward clarifying detainee rights to access
classified information, the decision does not and cannot go far enough on its
own. Al Odah connects access to classified information and a meaningful
review explicitly, and it requires detainee access to classified evidence, or a
summary of such evidence, wherever such access "is necessary to facilitate
a meaningful review. '483 By phrasing the issue in this way, and by
analogizing to CIPA, the Al Odah court correctly requires courts and
counsel alike to assess petitioner's access to classified information on a
case-by-case basis while still protecting sensitive information. Al Odah,
however, is limited in precedential value and deals only with classified
information at one specific point of the habeas hearings. In light of the
limited effect of the Al Odah decision, as well as the lack of clear guiding
principles enunciated in Boumediene, Congress should enact a statute
providing for fair and standard use and access to classified evidence
throughout the habeas cases.
The adoption of CIPA or a CIPA-like statute is appropriate in this setting
because with controlled and regulated access to classified evidence, or at
least summaries of such information, courts can strike the balance between
national security and a fair adjudication of detainee rights envisioned by the
Supreme Court. In keeping with the long tradition of the writ, habeas
corpus must adapt to the needs of the current situation to which it is being
applied and must be made to work within the confines of a statute
regulating classified evidence. CIPA, a flexible statute designed to promote
judicial creativity, is the ideal complement to the writ in this context,
allowing both a firm structure and the creativity required to achieve justice
while protecting national security. Indeed, without such a statute in place,
483. Al Odah v. United States, No. 05-5117, 2009 WL 564310, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6,
2009).
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the courts risk reaching judgments based on inconsistent standards and-of
far graver concern-failing to ensure that each petitioner be given a
"meaningful review" as required by the Supreme Court.
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